Burhan Formally Derecognizes RSF as State Institution; Nyala Aerial Campaign Enters Day 4 — Hemedti's TSC Deputy Role to Be Stripped
Estimated Deaths 150,000+ ▲
People Displaced 14 million+ ▲
Acutely Food Insecure 19.5 million (28.9M peak projected) ▲
Facing Starvation (IPC5) 400,000+ ▲
Displaced Children 6 million+ ▲
Children Out of School 17 million
In Need of Aid 34 million ▲
Latest Events
Al-Burhan Issues Executive Order Formally Derecognizing RSF as State Institution — Hemedti's Removal as TSC Deputy Imminent Tier 3 SAF Extends Nyala Aerial Campaign to Fourth Consecutive Day — RSF Soldiers Clash at Central Bank Amid Burhan's Derecognition Order Tier 2 Washington Post Investigation: Drones Have Transformed Sudan's War — 880+ Civilians Killed in Four Months as Aerial Campaign Intensifies Tier 2 WFP/FAO/UNICEF Joint Report: 19.5 Million Face Acute Food Insecurity in Sudan — Famine Risk Persists Despite Lean-Season Warning Tier 1 SAF Drone Strikes on Nyala Enter Third Consecutive Day — Al-Masane Weapons Depots Targeted as Hemedti Reported in City Tier 2Latest Events
LATESTMay 18, 2026 · 6 events
Military Operations
03
Military Operations
Casualties
04
Humanitarian Impact
| Category | Killed | Injured | Source | Tier | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Deaths (All Causes) | 150,000+ (est.) | Unknown | US Special Envoy / ACLED Modeling / UN | Official | Heavily Contested | Estimates range from 27,000 (UN verified) to 400,000 (US envoy high estimate). ACLED satellite modeling for Khartoum alone: 61,000+ deaths Apr 2023–Jun 2024. 90% of deaths go unrecorded. |
| UN-Documented Violent Deaths | 27,000+ | 33,000+ | UN OCHA / WHO Dec 2024 | Official | Contested | UN direct count; widely acknowledged as severe undercount. Covers only verifiable deaths where data reached UN systems. Most deaths from Sudan's blackout zones never reach official records. |
| Khartoum State Deaths (Modeled) | 61,000+ (all causes, Apr 2023–Jun 2024) | Unknown | ACLED / Science Magazine 2024 | Institutional | Contested | Satellite imagery and mortality modeling estimated 26,000+ intentional-injury deaths and 61,000+ all-cause deaths in Khartoum, a 50% increase over prewar mortality rate. |
| El Geneina / West Darfur Massacre Deaths | 10,000–15,000 | Unknown | UN Security Council Report / HRW 2024 | Official | Contested | Deaths in El Geneina from April to November 2023. Sudanese Red Crescent counted 2,000 bodies before stopping. UN Security Council report estimated 10,000–15,000 total killed, predominantly Massalit civilians. |
| Ardamata Massacre (El Geneina, Nov 8, 2023) | 800–2,000 | Unknown | HRW / Radio Dabanga / OHCHR | Major | Contested | RSF and Janjaweed massacred Massalit, Tama, and Erenga civilians in Ardamata neighborhood; ethnically targeted killings with mass sexual violence. One of the war's worst single-day atrocities. |
| El Fasher RSF Massacre (Oct 2025) | 1,500+ | Unknown | Al Jazeera / UN FFM Feb 2026 | Major | Contested | RSF massacres after capture of El Fasher; primarily Zaghawa and Fur ethnic communities. UN FFM characterized as 'hallmarks of genocide.' Worst single war crime of the entire conflict per humanitarian experts. |
| Zamzam IDP Camp Assault Deaths (Apr 2025) | 300–1,500 | 157+ | OCHA / MSF / WFP April 2025 | Official | Contested | RSF assault on Zamzam IDP camp (500,000 residents) in April 2025. Majority of victims were women and children. WFP had paused food distributions to the camp weeks before the assault. |
| Famine & Malnutrition Deaths | Uncounted; hundreds daily at peak | N/A | MSF / WFP / IPC 2024 | Official | Contested | MSF reported a child dying every 2 hours in Zamzam camp at peak famine conditions. 4.9 million children under 5 acutely malnourished. Experts believe starvation deaths exceed combat deaths. |
| Aid Workers Killed | 22+ | Unknown | OCHA / Aid Worker Security Database | Official | Verified | At least 22 aid workers killed since April 2023, including staff from MSF, WFP, UNHCR, and national NGOs. Many more injured or kidnapped. Sudan became one of the world's most dangerous humanitarian operations. |
| Sexual Violence Victims (Reported) | N/A | 3,396+ (MSF Darfur facilities Jan 2024–Nov 2025) | MSF / UN FFM / OHCHR March 2026 | Major | Contested | MSF documented 3,396 survivors (97% women and girls) treated at MSF facilities in North and South Darfur between January 2024 and November 2025 — described as 'only a fraction of the true scale.' RSF fighters frequently identified as perpetrators. UN FFM documented 400+ cases in first 16 months. Actual numbers vastly higher due to stigma and inaccessibility. |
| Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) | N/A | N/A (12.1 million displaced) | UNHCR / OCHA Dec 2024 | Official | Verified | 9.3 million IDPs within Sudan as of December 2024; world's largest internal displacement crisis. Over 6 million are children. Most displaced from Khartoum, Darfur, and Gezira states. |
| Refugees in Neighboring Countries | N/A | N/A (2.5 million refugees) | UNHCR Dec 2024 | Official | Verified | 2.5+ million Sudanese refugees in Chad (600,000+), Egypt (700,000+), South Sudan (400,000+), Ethiopia, and Libya. 90%+ of Darfur refugees arriving in Chad are women and children; 1 in 5 children arriving are acutely malnourished. |
| Healthcare Attacks — People Killed | 2,052+ | Unknown | WHO / OCHA / Al Jazeera April 2026 | Official | Verified | WHO documented 2,052 people killed and 217+ attacks on healthcare facilities since April 2023 as of April 2026. The RSF drone strike on Al-Jabalain Hospital (April 3, 2026) killed 10 including 7 medical staff. 37% of Sudan's health facilities are now non-functional. 65% of Darfur's population deprived of basic medical services. |
Economic Impact
05
Economic & Market Impact
GDP Contraction (2023) ▼ -12% from 2022
-12%
Source: IMF / World Bank 2023
Inflation Rate ▲ Hyperinflation since 2023
~200%+
Source: Sudan Central Bank / IMF estimates
RSF Gold Revenue (Annual) ▲ Primary RSF war financing source
$860M+
Source: UN Sanctions Monitors / Crisis Group 2024
Kenana Agro-Industrial Complex (Operational Capacity) ▼ Repeated RSF drone strikes since April 2026
~50% (est.)
Source: Dabanga Radio TV Online / Sudan Tribune May 2026
SAF Military-Economic Empire (Annual Revenue) ▼ Maintained through war via port/telecom/import control
$2B+
Source: IMF / Crisis Group Analysis 2024
Food Price Increase (Khartoum) ▲ 300% increase since April 2023
+300%
Source: WFP Market Monitoring / Sudan Tribune 2024
Agricultural Output (Gezira) ▼ Severe disruption from RSF occupation
-60% (est.)
Source: FAO / OCHA 2024
Oil Production ▼ Collapsed from pre-war levels
Near Zero
Source: Sudan Ministry of Petroleum / Reuters
UN Humanitarian Appeal Funding Gap ▼ Berlin Conference pledged €1.3B (Apr 15); 2026 appeal $2.9B requested, only 16% disbursed as of Apr 1 — pledges yet to materialize
~84% underfunded
Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service / Berlin Conference Apr 2026
Sudanese Pound Devaluation ▼ Severe parallel market depreciation
-85% (USD black market)
Source: Sudan Transparency / Informal Market Data 2024
Internet & Telecom Connectivity ▼ 80%+ disruption from war
~20% operational
Source: NetBlocks / OCHA 2024
Aviation Revenue Lost Since War (Apr 2023–May 2026) ▼ 3-year cumulative loss; airport only reopened Apr 2026 and hit again May 4–5
$1B+
Source: Sudan Civil Aviation Authority / Sudan Tribune May 10, 2026
Contested Claims
06
Contested Claims Matrix
22 claims · click to expandDid UAE and Ethiopia coordinate drone attacks on Khartoum International Airport (May 2026)?
Source A: Sudan Government / SAF
Sudan's military presented documented technical evidence on May 5, 2026 that four drone attacks since March 1 originated from Ethiopia's Bahir Dar airport. A drone bearing serial number S88 was identified as Emirati-manufactured property. Sudan recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia, announced plans to submit evidence to the UN Security Council, and said it reserved the right to respond militarily. Foreign Minister Mohieddin Salem stated Sudan was 'ready to enter into open confrontation with Ethiopia if it becomes necessary.' Sudan framed the attacks as a coordinated UAE–Ethiopia effort to support the RSF's campaign against SAF infrastructure.
Source B: UAE / Ethiopia
Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected Sudan's accusations as 'baseless,' accusing Sudan's armed forces of supporting 'mercenaries' from the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and violating Ethiopian sovereignty. The UAE denied any involvement in the Khartoum airport attack, reiterating its long-standing denial of supplying weapons to any party in Sudan's conflict. International powers including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the US, and EU condemned the attacks without endorsing Sudan's specific accusations. No independent body verified the Bahir Dar launch origin.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved as of May 9, 2026. Khartoum airport reopened May 8–9 after a 4-day closure; Badr Airlines resumed flights and Tarco/Sudanair announced resumption. Sudan's UNSC evidence package (serial numbers, radar tracks) advanced; UAE and Ethiopia maintain denials. No independent body has verified the Bahir Dar launch origin claim. Sudan's ambassador remains recalled from Addis Ababa. SAF has deployed troops and anti-aircraft systems to three Ethiopian border zones (East Gallabat, Basunda, Al-Fashaga) as a show of force.
Who fired the first shot on April 15, 2023?
Source A: SAF Position
The SAF maintains that RSF launched the war by attacking military installations and the Presidential Palace without provocation. RSF's pre-positioning of troops near Merowe in April 2023 and their refusal to stand down constituted the first act of aggression, and RSF fighters attacked SAF General Command before SAF responded.
Source B: RSF Position
The RSF claimed SAF forces attacked RSF positions first and that RSF acted in self-defense. Hemedti accused Burhan of ordering a pre-emptive strike, stating SAF forces fired on RSF locations in Khartoum before 9 AM. The RSF framed its own attacks as defensive responses to SAF aggression.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved; both sides have consistently denied responsibility. Independent investigators have been unable to conclusively determine who fired first given the near-simultaneous nature of attacks at multiple sites.
Do RSF actions in Darfur constitute genocide?
Source A: UN / US / HRW
The US government formally declared in January 2025 that RSF and allied militias committed genocide against the Massalit and other non-Arab communities in Darfur. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found 'hallmarks of genocide' in El Fasher (Feb 2026). HRW documented systematic ethnic targeting of Massalit, Fur, and Zaghawa communities. RSF fighters reportedly stated intent to 'eliminate anything black from Darfur.'
Source B: RSF / UAE
The RSF has denied genocide allegations, claiming its operations targeted armed militias and terrorists rather than civilian populations. UAE, RSF's primary financial backer, denied that weapons and financing it provided were used for genocide. RSF leadership characterized their actions as counter-insurgency against non-Arab armed groups defending their communities.
⚖ RESOLUTION: US formally designated RSF genocide (Jan 7, 2025). UN FFM found 'hallmarks of genocide' (Feb 2026). US House Foreign Affairs Committee passed bipartisan 44–2 resolution calling for RSF terrorist designation (May 14, 2026). Al-Burhan formally derecognized RSF as a state institution (May 18, 2026). ICC investigation ongoing in Darfur. RSF and UAE deny all genocide designations.
Is the UAE providing weapons to the RSF?
Source A: UN Monitors / Sudan SAF
UN Security Council sanctions monitors named the UAE in 2024 as involved in aiding the RSF with weapons and financing. Sudan's SAF government formally severed diplomatic relations with the UAE and expelled its ambassador. Independent researchers documented UAE-marked weapons in RSF-held areas. The RSF's Al Junaid corporation smuggles gold primarily to the UAE, which provides hard currency for weapons purchases.
Source B: UAE Government
The UAE denied providing weapons or financing to the RSF. Abu Dhabi called UN sanctions reports 'inaccurate' and rejected the accusations as politically motivated. UAE officials maintained they supported a negotiated peace process and humanitarian assistance to Sudan without taking sides. The UAE acknowledged business ties with RSF-affiliated gold mining operations but denied these constituted weapons financing.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN sanctions monitors formally accused UAE of RSF weapons support in 2024. Sudan severed UAE diplomatic ties. Investigation ongoing; UAE denies all allegations.
How many people have died in Sudan's civil war?
Source A: High Estimates (US Envoy / Researchers)
Former US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello suggested as many as 400,000 people have died since April 2023. ACLED satellite modeling estimated more than 26,000 deaths from intentional injury in Khartoum alone between April 2023 and June 2024, with 61,000 total deaths—50% above prewar rates. Researchers note 90% of Khartoum deaths go unrecorded due to blackout conditions.
Source B: Lower Estimates (UN Direct Count)
UN agencies directly documented approximately 27,000 deaths and 33,000 injuries since April 2023 as of late 2024. These figures reflect only verified, directly counted deaths. The UN acknowledged its figures are severe undercounts due to access restrictions, media blackouts, and collapse of health reporting systems across war zones.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Deeply contested due to access restrictions; estimates range from 27,000 (UN verified) to 400,000 (US envoy estimate). Scientific modeling suggests the true figure is in the range of 150,000+. Most experts agree real numbers are far higher than officially reported.
What was the correct RSF-SAF integration timeline?
Source A: SAF / Political Transition Framework
The SAF and civilian transition parties agreed that RSF should be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces within 2 years under the 2022 Framework Agreement. Full integration was viewed as essential for Sudan's democratic transition. SAF leadership insisted on civilian control of the military and a unified chain of command as prerequisites for handing power to civilians.
Source B: RSF / Hemedti
The RSF demanded a 10-year timeline for integration, arguing that rapid absorption would destroy RSF's identity and leave its fighters vulnerable. Hemedti also demanded that RSF officers retain their ranks and that the RSF not be placed under army command until political transition was complete. The RSF saw a short timeline as an SAF power grab designed to eliminate a rival force.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The integration dispute remained unresolved at the time of war outbreak in April 2023. The 2-year vs. 10-year impasse was the primary stated trigger for war.
Have SAF airstrikes unlawfully killed civilians?
Source A: SAF / Government Position
The SAF maintained that airstrikes targeted legitimate military objectives—RSF command posts, weapons depots, and troop concentrations—even in urban areas. The SAF argued RSF's deliberate use of civilian neighborhoods and buildings as military bases created RSF responsibility for collateral civilian harm. SAF denied targeting civilian-only areas.
Source B: UN / HRW / Amnesty
The UN Fact-Finding Mission concluded that SAF airstrikes in Khartoum, Omdurman, and other cities caused widespread civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. Amnesty International documented SAF strikes on markets, hospitals, and residential areas with no discernible military purpose. HRW reported over 145 healthcare facilities hit by both sides, with evidence of SAF responsibility for several direct strikes.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN FFM (Sept 2024) concluded both SAF and RSF committed international humanitarian law violations. SAF sanctioned by US for aid obstruction (2025). ICC investigation covers both parties.
How much of Khartoum did the RSF actually control?
Source A: RSF Claims
The RSF repeatedly claimed to control the Presidential Palace, all three international airports, state media facilities, and most of Khartoum's residential areas from the opening hours of April 15, 2023. RSF communications boasted control of 80-90% of Khartoum within the first week. Hemedti stated the RSF had 'entered Khartoum' and seized its institutions.
Source B: SAF / Independent Assessment
The SAF disputed RSF claims of controlling key strategic sites. Satellite imagery and ACLED analysis confirmed RSF controlled most residential Khartoum by mid-2023 but that SAF retained control of its General Command headquarters, parts of Khartoum East, and several military installations. Full RSF control was never achieved even at the height of RSF dominance.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Independent satellite and ACLED analysis confirmed RSF controlled 60-70% of Khartoum residential areas by mid-2023, with SAF retaining military complexes. SAF recaptured most of Khartoum by March 2025.
Is the RSF the same as the Janjaweed responsible for the 2003-2010 Darfur genocide?
Source A: HRW / Survivors / Darfur Communities
Human rights organizations and Darfur survivor communities maintain that the RSF was formally institutionalized from Janjaweed militias in 2013 under President Omar al-Bashir, making it a direct organizational successor. RSF fighters in West Darfur in 2023 referred to themselves as Arab militias and used the same ethnic targeting patterns as the 2003-era Janjaweed. Massalit survivors identified RSF commanders as former Janjaweed leaders.
Source B: RSF / UAE / Some Analysts
RSF leadership argued the force was a reformed, professional institution distinct from informal Janjaweed militias. Hemedti, himself a former Janjaweed commander, claimed to have professionalized RSF into a conventional military force with command accountability. Supporters argued the RSF 2023 atrocities represented command failures rather than institutional continuation of genocide policy.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The direct organizational link between Janjaweed and RSF is documented. The US genocide determination and UN FFM findings affirm continuity of ethnically targeted violence against the same non-Arab communities.
Is starvation being deliberately used as a weapon of war in Sudan?
Source A: UN / WFP / Aid Organizations
The UN Fact-Finding Mission explicitly concluded that the RSF used starvation as a method of warfare, constituting a war crime. Both RSF and SAF restricted humanitarian access: RSF blocked aid convoys, looted WFP supplies, and besieged populated cities including El Fasher. SAF restricted cross-border humanitarian operations into Darfur and denied access to RSF-held areas. The resulting famine in Zamzam camp (declared August 2024) was a foreseeable consequence.
Source B: SAF Government
The SAF government denied deliberately blocking aid, attributing access restrictions to legitimate security concerns and RSF interference with supply routes. SAF authorized cross-border aid to Darfur in late 2024 under international pressure but cited RSF use of humanitarian corridors for weapons smuggling as justification for controls. The SAF characterized RSF-held areas as beyond its security responsibility.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN FFM concluded both parties restricted humanitarian access as a method of war; RSF found responsible for deliberate starvation. US sanctioned Burhan (SAF) in 2025 for aid obstruction. Famine IPC Phase 5 confirmed in multiple areas.
Who bears responsibility for civilian deaths during the El Fasher siege?
Source A: UN / HRW / International Community
The UN and human rights organizations placed primary responsibility on the RSF for besieging El Fasher and deliberately targeting the civilian population. The RSF attacked IDP camps, humanitarian supply routes, and the Teaching Hospital. UN investigators warned repeatedly that RSF's siege would constitute crimes against humanity if continued. The RSF's stated intent to capture the city would, in UN experts' view, 'complete the genocide' in Darfur.
Source B: RSF Position
The RSF claimed its operations targeted SAF military positions within El Fasher and that civilians were harmed due to SAF's use of the city as a military stronghold. RSF accused SAF of deliberately sheltering behind civilian population. The RSF disputed IDP camp attack allegations, claiming it targeted armed groups operating from within camps.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN FFM found 'hallmarks of genocide' in RSF's El Fasher campaign. RSF captured El Fasher in October 2025; subsequent massacres documented. ICC investigation ongoing.
Is the RSF's 'Government of Peace and Unity' a legitimate government?
Source A: RSF / RSF Backers
The RSF and its foreign supporters argue the RSF-backed 'Government of Peace and Unity' declared in Nyala in February 2025 represents legitimate governance over Darfur and other RSF-held territories. The RSF charter declared secular democracy and decentralization, positioning the RSF as an anti-military progressive force. Some civic leaders in RSF areas signed the charter under unclear conditions.
Source B: SAF / AU / International Community
The international community, African Union, and the vast majority of states refused to recognize the RSF's parallel government. The AU condemned the declaration as an unconstitutional act threatening Sudan's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The SAF's Port Sudan government retains international recognition. Critics noted that signatories to the RSF charter operated under RSF military occupation with no free civic space.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Internationally unrecognized. The AU condemned it and called for preservation of Sudanese sovereignty. As of March 2026, no UN member state has extended recognition to the RSF government.
Why did the Jeddah peace talks fail?
Source A: SAF / SAF Supporters
The SAF suspended Jeddah talks in August 2023 citing RSF bad faith: the RSF continued military operations during ceasefire periods, refused to withdraw from Khartoum residential areas, and used ceasefire discussions as cover to reposition forces. SAF argued the Jeddah process was unworkable because the RSF had no intention of accepting a political settlement that would subordinate it to civilian authority.
Source B: RSF / RSF Allies
The RSF accused the SAF of demanding impossible preconditions for talks — including RSF withdrawal from all occupied positions — while continuing SAF airstrikes during negotiations. RSF representatives at Jeddah argued SAF never genuinely engaged with power-sharing arrangements. The RSF blamed US and Saudi mediators for favoring SAF positions and pressuring RSF while letting SAF off the hook.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Talks collapsed August 2023 with no lasting ceasefire achieved. Neither AU nor IGAD-led successor efforts have brought parties back to negotiations. War continued to escalate post-collapse.
What is the scale of sexual violence in Sudan's war?
Source A: UN / HRW / Survivors
The UN Fact-Finding Mission documented 400+ women who sought medical care for sexual violence between April 2023 and July 2024, acknowledging real numbers are 'far higher.' HRW documented systematic RSF sexual violence as a weapon of war in Darfur, Khartoum, and Gezira. Survivor testimonies describe mass rape during RSF attacks on neighborhoods. Doctors treating victims reported seeing patterns consistent with organized, military-ordered sexual violence.
Source B: RSF Position
The RSF denied using sexual violence as a systematic weapon of war, attributing reported incidents to actions by individual fighters acting outside orders. RSF leadership claimed to have disciplined fighters found guilty of sexual violence. RSF dismissed comprehensive documentation as politically motivated propaganda by pro-SAF or Western actors seeking to delegitimize RSF governance.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN FFM concluded sexual violence was systematic and widespread. Both RSF and SAF forces have been implicated, with RSF bearing the greater documented responsibility. ICC investigation includes sexual violence as a focus.
Was the October 2021 military coup justified?
Source A: SAF/RSF Coup Leaders
Gen. al-Burhan and Hemedti justified the October 2021 coup by citing what they described as political dysfunction and civilian government incompetence that endangered Sudan's stability. They claimed the military was protecting the revolution from rival civilian factions engaged in corruption and power struggles. Military officials argued a brief military stewardship was necessary to stabilize the transition before returning to democracy.
Source B: Civilian Forces / International Community
The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the UN, AU, US, and EU condemned the coup as an illegal seizure of power that betrayed Sudan's 2019 democratic revolution. Massive civilian protests (the 'marches of millions') demanded military withdrawal from politics. PM Hamdok, reinstated briefly under pressure, said the coup had 'created a political crisis that threatens the whole transition.' The coup's failure to deliver stability proved the critics correct.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Internationally condemned. PM Hamdok resigned January 2022. Coup directly created conditions for the 2023 war between coup partners al-Burhan and Hemedti.
Does the RSF use gold revenues to finance the war?
Source A: UN Monitors / Researchers
UN sanctions monitors, Crisis Group, and independent researchers documented that the RSF's Al Junaid Multi-Activities Corporation controls gold mines generating an estimated $860 million annually in Darfur alone. Gold is predominantly smuggled to the UAE, providing RSF with hard currency for weapons, salaries, and operations. Gold revenues have financed RSF military campaigns throughout the war, enabling continued fighting despite international sanctions.
Source B: RSF / UAE
The RSF and UAE characterized Al Junaid's gold operations as legal commercial activities predating the war, arguing they do not constitute war financing. RSF denied that gold revenues specifically fund military operations, framing Al Junaid as a civilian economic enterprise distinct from the RSF's military command. The UAE denied that gold purchased from Al Junaid-affiliated sources constituted violation of any sanctions regime.
⚖ RESOLUTION: UN sanctions monitors documented the financial flows in 2024. The US Treasury sanctioned RSF-linked gold companies. Sudan formally accused UAE of enabling RSF financing. Dispute ongoing.
Were Hemedti and Burhan equal partners in the 2021 coup?
Source A: Military Historians / Crisis Group
Analysis by Crisis Group and Sudan researchers characterized the October 2021 coup as a joint Burhan-Hemedti operation with both generals sharing power. Hemedti was publicly present alongside Burhan during the coup announcement and was part of the post-coup Sovereignty Council. Burhan held the nominal position of chairman, but Hemedti's RSF provided critical military muscle. The partnership of equals was always fragile given RSF-SAF institutional rivalry.
Source B: SAF / Burhan Allies
SAF-aligned accounts characterized the coup as primarily a military institution action led by Gen. Burhan as Sudan's senior military commander, with RSF as a subordinate partner. This framing positioned Hemedti as a junior partner whose subsequent insistence on RSF parity represented overreach. SAF narrative portrayed Hemedti's power claims as RSF expansion beyond its appropriate role.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Historical evidence shows co-equal participation in the coup's execution. The power-sharing arrangement's breakdown directly led to the 2023 war.
Is Sudan's famine a deliberate act or collateral damage of war?
Source A: UN / WFP / Aid Organizations
UN experts concluded that Sudan's famine conditions, including those in Zamzam camp, resulted from deliberate actions by both parties: RSF siege of El Fasher cutting food supplies, RSF attacks on agricultural areas and water infrastructure, SAF restrictions on cross-line aid, and both sides looting humanitarian aid. The UN Fact-Finding Mission explicitly stated RSF used starvation as a method of warfare. The predictability of famine given documented access restrictions demonstrated intentionality.
Source B: SAF Government
SAF government representatives argued that famine was an unintended consequence of war disruption, compounded by pre-existing food insecurity and climate pressures. The SAF blamed RSF for creating famine conditions by occupying agricultural land and blocking aid routes in areas under RSF control. SAF pointed to its authorization of cross-border aid access in 2024 as evidence it did not deliberately pursue famine as a policy tool.
⚖ RESOLUTION: IPC declared famine (Phase 5) in Zamzam camp August 2024. UN FFM concluded deliberate starvation tactics used primarily by RSF. US sanctioned Burhan in 2025 partly for SAF aid obstruction.
Did Iran's support enable the SAF counteroffensive?
Source A: Analysts / Media Reports
Multiple analysts and media reports cited Iranian-supplied drone technology — including Shahed-type loitering munitions — as significantly enhancing SAF strike capabilities during the 2024-2025 counteroffensive. SAF's ability to conduct sustained precision strikes on RSF positions in Omdurman and Khartoum reportedly reflected new Iranian drone systems, analogous to Iran's drone supply to Russia in Ukraine. The SAF counteroffensive gains coincided closely with reported delivery of Iranian hardware.
Source B: SAF Government / Iran
The SAF government did not publicly confirm receipt of Iranian military equipment, though it did not deny it either. Iran denied providing arms to the SAF. SAF officials attributed counteroffensive success to Sudanese military professionalism, local initiative, and improved tactics rather than foreign weapons. Some analysts cautioned that RSF overextension and supply problems, rather than specific weapons systems, drove SAF gains.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Unconfirmed by either party. Analysts assess Iranian drone supply as likely based on available evidence. SAF counteroffensive gains corroborated as substantial regardless of equipment origin.
Is a civilian-led democratic transition still possible in Sudan?
Source A: Civilian Forces / International Community
Sudanese civilian groups, led by the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Taqaddum coalition, maintain that a political settlement including civilian governance remains essential and possible. They point to the 2022 Framework Agreement as a viable blueprint. International mediators including the AU, US, and Saudi Arabia have consistently called for civilian inclusion in any peace process. Sudan's 2019 revolution demonstrated strong grassroots democratic aspiration.
Source B: Realist Analysts / War Outcome Logic
Many Sudan analysts assess that both SAF and RSF are militarized institutions with no genuine interest in civilian oversight. With both sides pursuing military victory, the two-rival-government reality of 2025 suggests Sudan is drifting toward de facto partition rather than democratic transition. The displacement of 12 million people and destruction of state institutions makes civilian governance capacity extremely limited for the foreseeable future.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved; ongoing. No active peace negotiations as of March 2026. Two rival governments in place. International community continues to call for ceasefire and civilian inclusion but lacks leverage.
Did RSF commit atrocities during the capture and occupation of Wad Madani?
Source A: Survivors / HRW / Sudan Tribune
Survivors and human rights organizations reported widespread looting, sexual violence, and killings in Wad Madani during and after RSF capture in December 2023. Gezira State had been regarded as a safe area until RSF arrived; the fall was a massive shock. Radio Dabanga documented hundreds of cases of looting and extortion. Thousands fled immediately as RSF imposed 'taxes' and seized property.
Source B: RSF Position
RSF leadership claimed its forces entered Wad Madani in a disciplined military operation targeting SAF, portraying the city's population as welcoming RSF as a liberating force from an unpopular military government. The RSF denied systematic atrocities, attributing incidents to rogue fighters or criminal elements taking advantage of the transition of control.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Independent documentation from HRW, Radio Dabanga, and survivor accounts confirms widespread RSF looting, sexual violence, and extortion during Wad Madani occupation (Dec 2023–Jan 2025). SAF recaptured the city January 2025.
Does the conflict in West Darfur meet the legal definition of genocide?
Source A: US Government / UN FFM / Genocide Watch
The US State Department formally declared in January 2025 that RSF and allied militias committed genocide against the Massalit in Darfur. The UN Fact-Finding Mission found evidence establishing three underlying acts of genocide in Darfur, particularly in West Darfur and El Fasher. Genocide Watch issued a 'Genocide Emergency' for Sudan in January 2025. The pattern of systematic killing, ethnic targeting, and explicit statements by RSF fighters about exterminating non-Arab communities meets the Genocide Convention's standards.
Source B: RSF / Some Legal Scholars
The RSF denied genocide intent, the key legal element distinguishing genocide from ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Some international law scholars cautioned that proving 'specific intent to destroy' a group legally requires higher evidentiary standards than available. The ICC has not yet issued genocide charges in relation to the current conflict, and establishing genocide through international courts is a lengthy process.
⚖ RESOLUTION: US formal genocide designation (Jan 7, 2025). UN FFM 'hallmarks of genocide' (Feb 2026). ICC investigation ongoing. RSF denies. Legal proceedings required for formal international judicial determination.
Political Landscape
07
Political & Diplomatic
M
Mohieddin Salem
Sudan Foreign Minister (SAF government); recalled ambassador to Ethiopia on May 5, 2026 and announced Sudan's plan to submit UAE drone evidence to the UN Security Council
Whoever attacks us will be met with a response. Sudan is ready to enter into open confrontation with Ethiopia if it becomes necessary. We will not initiate attacks, but we will defend our sovereignty.
Y
Lt. Gen. Yasser al-Atta
SAF Chief of Staff (appointed April 2026); part of Burhan's April 12 reshuffle of 21 generals — the largest command shakeup since the war began. Replaces Gen. Othman al-Hussein.
The armed forces will pursue the war to its conclusion and restore the Sudanese state across all its territory. No rebel force will be allowed to persist.
B
Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan
SAF Commander-in-Chief; Head of State (returned to Khartoum May 14, 2026). Conducted Gulf diplomatic tour in mid-May 2026, meeting Bahrain's King to build regional support for SAF's military position. Issued executive order on May 18 formally derecognizing RSF as a state institution, cutting off RSF members from government payroll — the most significant legal delegitimization of RSF since the war began. Ordered formal removal of Hemedti from Transitional Sovereignty Council (announced May 19), naming Malik Agar as replacement. Oversaw government's formal return to Khartoum from Port Sudan and the Central Bank's resumption of capital operations.
The Rapid Support Forces are a rebel group outside the framework of the state, and they will be dealt with accordingly.
H
Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti)
RSF Commander; Head of RSF 'Government of Peace and Unity'. Facing compounding crises: three senior commanders defected since March 2026 (Brig. Gen. El Safana, May 11 most recent). Brother Algoney EU-sanctioned (May 2026). SAF airstrikes destroyed Al Zorg — his hometown — on May 14, killing 64 civilians including two relatives. Al-Burhan's May 18 executive order formally derecognized RSF as a state institution, triggering payroll cutoffs for RSF soldiers and clearing the path for Hemedti's formal removal from the Transitional Sovereignty Council as SAF deputy (Malik Agar named replacement, May 19). Reports place Hemedti in RSF-held Nyala amid SAF's 4-day aerial campaign targeting the city. Claimed force of 450,000; declared willingness to fight until 2040.
We fight for the people of Sudan. The army wants to return Sudan to the dark days of the Bashir regime, and we will not allow it.
H
Abdalla Hamdok
Former Prime Minister (2019–2022); Taqaddum Civilian Coalition Leader
What is happening in Sudan is a war of generals who are fighting over power and wealth, at the expense of the Sudanese people and their democratic aspirations.
K
Khamis Abakar
West Darfur Governor (assassinated June 14, 2023)
What is happening in West Darfur is genocide. The RSF and the Arab militias are committing massacres against the Masalit people.
M
Minni Minnawi
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-MM) Leader; North Darfur Governor
El Fasher must not fall. If El Fasher falls, the genocide will be complete. The international community must act before it is too late.
J
Jibril Ibrahim
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Leader; Finance Minister (SAF government)
The RSF is a criminal organization that must be dismantled. There can be no peace in Sudan until the RSF is defeated and disarmed.
V
Volker Perthes
UN Special Envoy for Sudan (2021–2024)
There is no military solution to this conflict. Both parties must commit to a genuine ceasefire and return to negotiations to spare the Sudanese people further suffering.
R
Ramtane Lamamra
Former African Union High Representative / Former UN Envoy for Sudan (replaced Feb 2026)
The African Union calls on both parties to immediately cease hostilities and engage in dialogue. Sudan's crisis threatens the stability of the entire region.
P
Pekka Haavisto
UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Sudan (appointed Feb 2026)
The United Nations remains committed to facilitating a ceasefire and protecting civilians. We call on all parties to engage with the peace process in good faith.
T
Tom Fletcher
UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (OCHA), from 2025; issued landmark April 22, 2026 warning that the world is failing Sudan
This grim and chastening anniversary marks another year when the world has failed to meet the test of Sudan. Nearly 34 million people — 65% of the population — are in urgent need of humanitarian support. We cannot fail them again.
M
Martin Griffiths
Former UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (OCHA) (2019–2025)
Sudan is now the world's largest humanitarian crisis. Never in modern history have so many people faced starvation and famine as in Sudan today.
T
Tom Perriello
US Special Envoy for Sudan (2024–2025)
The death toll in Sudan may be as high as 400,000 people. This is one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world and the international response has been wholly inadequate.
S
Sameh Shoukry
Egyptian Foreign Minister; SAF diplomatic ally
Egypt fully supports the legitimate Sudanese Armed Forces in their effort to restore order and state authority. Sudan's security is directly linked to Egypt's security.
D
Mahamat Déby
President of Chad; humanitarian border management
Chad cannot close its border to Sudanese brothers fleeing the war. But we need urgent international support to address this massive refugee crisis.
O
Osman Hussein
Sudan's UN Ambassador (SAF government representative)
We call on the Security Council to take decisive action against the RSF and those who fund them. The UAE's role in financing this genocide cannot continue without consequences.
M
Mariam al-Mahdi
National Umma Party; Democratic Unionist civilian opposition
Both generals must be held accountable. This war was started by two military men fighting over power — neither represents the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people.
A
Abdelaziz al-Hilu
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) Leader, South Kordofan
The war between SAF and RSF has created an opportunity to resolve Sudan's structural problems through a secular democratic state, but the international community ignores Sudan's marginalized peoples.
F
Filippo Grandi
UNHCR High Commissioner for Refugees
Sudan now has the world's largest displacement crisis. Twelve million people have been forced from their homes in a war that has been largely ignored by the international community.
A
Abdallah Adam Ismail
Massalit community leader; West Darfur survivor advocate
The Massalit are being exterminated. We had nothing to do with this war between the generals. The RSF targeted us because of who we are — Massalit, Africans, not Arab.
B
Massad Boulos
US Senior Advisor for Africa (Trump Administration); leading US push for a humanitarian truce in Sudan. Proposed demilitarization-first ceasefire backed by UN oversight mechanism for El Fasher and parts of Kordofan.
The United States is deeply committed to achieving a ceasefire in Sudan. The humanitarian toll is catastrophic and the international community must do more to end this conflict.
Timeline
01
Historical Timeline
1941 – PresentMilitaryDiplomaticHumanitarianEconomicActive
Prewar Tensions (2021–Apr 2023)
Oct 25, 2021
Military Coup Ousts Civilian Government
Dec 5, 2021
Hamdok Reinstated, Then Resigns
2013
RSF Formally Created from Janjaweed Militias
Apr 11, 2019
Omar al-Bashir Overthrown in Military Coup
Dec 5, 2022
Political Framework Agreement Signed
Apr 11, 2023
RSF Deploys Near Merowe, Tensions Peak
War Erupts: Khartoum Under Fire (Apr–May 2023)
Apr 15, 2023
War Breaks Out in Khartoum
Apr 15, 2023
RSF Storms Gen. Burhan's Residence
Apr 16, 2023
EU Ambassador Assaulted, US Convoy Fired Upon
Apr 25, 2023
US-Saudi 72-Hour Ceasefire Immediately Violated
Apr 22, 2023
Foreign Nations Evacuate Nationals from Khartoum
May 25, 2023
UN Security Council Demands Immediate Ceasefire in Sudan
May 6, 2023
Jeddah Peace Talks Begin Under US-Saudi Mediation
Battle for Khartoum & Darfur Erupts (Jun–Nov 2023)
Apr 24, 2023
RSF Attacks Massalit Neighborhoods in El Geneina
Jun 14, 2023
West Darfur Governor Khamis Abakar Assassinated
Jun 15, 2023
RSF Opens Fire on Civilian Evacuation Convoy in El Geneina
Jul 2023
RSF Consolidates Control Across Most of Khartoum
Jul 13, 2023
UN Discovers Mass Grave of 87 Massalit near El Geneina
Aug 2023
Jeddah Peace Talks Officially Collapse
Jun 2023
MSF and ICRC Suspend Operations After Aid Workers Killed
Jun 2023
West Darfur State Falls Entirely to RSF
Oct 2023
RSF Captures Nyala, Capital of South Darfur
Nov 8, 2023
Ardamata Massacre: Up to 2,000 Killed in El Geneina
Dec 6, 2023
US Declares RSF Committed Crimes Against Humanity in Darfur
Dec 19, 2023
RSF Seizes Wad Madani, Capital of Gezira State
Humanitarian Collapse & Darfur Siege (Jan–Aug 2024)
May 2024
RSF Begins Siege of El Fasher — Last SAF Hold in Darfur
Aug 2024
Famine Declared in Zamzam IDP Camp
Sep 2024
UN Fact-Finding Mission: Both Sides Committed 'Appalling' Abuses
Jan 2024
IPC Warns Sudan on Brink of Famine
Feb 2024
RSF Captures All Four Southern Darfur State Capitals
Feb 2025
RSF Announces Plans for Parallel Government
Jun 2024
SAF Airstrikes Strike RSF Positions in Omdurman
Mar 2024
RSF Extends Control Across Gezira State
Jul 2024
UN Sanctions Monitors Name UAE as RSF Weapons Supplier
2024
Healthcare System Near-Collapse Across War Zones
SAF Counteroffensive (Sep 2024–Mar 2025)
Sep 2024
SAF Launches Coordinated Khartoum Counteroffensive
Jan 2025
SAF Retakes Bahri and Omdurman; Expels RSF from North Khartoum
Jan 7, 2025
US Formally Designates RSF Genocide in Darfur
Oct 2024
SAF Drone Strikes Shift Battle for Khartoum
Jan 2025
SAF Recaptures Wad Madani, Gezira State Capital
Feb 2025
SAF Breaks RSF Siege of El Obeid, North Kordofan Capital
Mar 2025
SAF Announces Recapture of Khartoum Proper
Ongoing War & Darfur Genocide (Oct 2025–Present)
Oct 2025
El Fasher Falls — RSF Completes Darfur Conquest
Oct 29, 2025
RSF Kills at Least 1,500 in El Fasher Post-Capture Massacres
Apr 2025
RSF Launches Full-Scale Assault on Zamzam IDP Camp
Feb 2026
UN Fact-Finding Mission: El Fasher Shows 'Hallmarks of Genocide'
Feb 2025
WFP Temporarily Halts Food Distribution to Zamzam Camp
2025
UN Security Council Calls for Ceasefire; Arms Embargo Blocked
2025
Sudan Splits: Two Rival Governments Assert Sovereignty
Mar 2026
Battles for Kordofan Continue as War Enters Third Year
SAF-RSF War 2023–
Mar 4, 2026
SAF Drone Strike Kills 50 at Al-Muglad Market and Hospital, West Kordofan
Mar 7, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes on Abu Zabad and Wad Banda Markets Kill at Least 40
Mar 9, 2026
RSF Drone Strikes Kosti University Dormitory, White Nile State
Mar 10, 2026
SAF Drone Kills 50 Civilians in Al-Sunut Lorry Strike, West Kordofan
Mar 11, 2026
RSF Drone Kills 17 at Shukeiri School and Health Clinic, White Nile State
Mar 12, 2026
Drone Strike Near Sudan-Chad Border Kills 4, Injures Many
Mar 13, 2026
SAF Drone Kills 11 at Adikong Market, West Darfur
Mar 16, 2026
RSF Recaptures Bara and Seizes Karnoi; SAF Repels Dilling Assault
Mar 16, 2026
OHCHR: 200+ Civilians Killed by Drones Since March 4 in Kordofan and White Nile
Mar 18, 2026
RSF Drone Kills 17 in Chadian Border Town of Tine During Ramadan Iftar
Mar 20, 2026
Hospital Strike on Eid al-Fitr Kills 64 in Al Daein, East Darfur
Mar 21, 2026
WHO Confirms 64 Killed in Al Daein Hospital Strike; International Condemnation Mounts
Mar 21, 2026
RSF Drone Strikes Ad Dabbah, Northern State; 6 Killed, Electricity Infrastructure Damaged
Mar 22, 2026
Drone Strike Kills 23 on Civilian Convoy in Ed Daein, East Darfur
Mar 22, 2026
Daily Drone Strikes on Kordofan Markets and Health Facilities
Mar 22, 2026
OHCHR: RSF Violations in El Fasher Capture Amount to War Crimes
Mar 22, 2026
Two Famines Declared; 400,000 Facing Starvation
Mar 23, 2026
RSF and SPLM-N Capture Kurmuk; Roseires Dam and Ed Damazin Threatened in Blue Nile Offensive
Mar 23, 2026
SAF Drones Strike Lagawa, West Kordofan; At Least 15 Killed, 23 Wounded in Residential Areas
Mar 23, 2026
Chadian Forces Shoot Civilians at Um Dukhun Border; 5 Killed, 14 Injured on Eid al-Fitr
Mar 24, 2026
UN Report: Sudan Hospital Strikes Highlight Drone Warfare Surge; 2,000+ Killed in Healthcare Attacks
Mar 25, 2026
RSF Massacre 16 Civilians in El Fasher; Raoul Wallenberg Centre Documents 40+ Razed Villages
Mar 26, 2026
SAF Drones Strike Sarf Umra Market and Government HQ, North Darfur; Civilian Casualties
Mar 26, 2026
RSF-SPLM-N Alliance Advances Toward Ed Damazin After Kurmuk Fall; Roseires Dam at Risk
Mar 26, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Civilian Vehicle in Al-Rahad, North Kordofan — 6 Killed, 12 Injured
Mar 26, 2026
New UN Envoy Haavisto Meets Burhan in Port Sudan; No Ceasefire Agreement
Mar 27, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Funeral in Al Sunut, West Kordofan — 7 Killed, 39 Wounded
Mar 27, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Zalingei, Hits IDP Camp Khamsa Daqaiq in Central Darfur
Mar 27, 2026
Second SAF Strike on Lagawa Kills 15 in West Kordofan
Mar 28, 2026
RSF-SPLM-N Launch Major Assault on Dilling, South Kordofan; Residential Areas Shelled
Mar 28, 2026
425+ Families Flee Geissan (Blue Nile) Amid RSF-SPLM-N Military Buildup; Roseires Dam Fears Grow
Mar 28, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Continue on Zalingei, Central Darfur; IDP Camp Areas Hit
Mar 29, 2026
RSF-SPLM-N Shelling Kills 14 Civilians Including 5 Children in Dilling; Sudan Doctors Warn of El Fasher-Scale Catastrophe
Mar 29, 2026
US Pushes UNSC Humanitarian Ceasefire Resolution; UN Sanctions Hemedti's Brother and 3 RSF Commanders
Mar 30, 2026
Dilling Siege Enters Day 3; Habila Road Remains Severed as Commodities Disappear
Mar 30, 2026
RSF 'Shifts Ambitions to South' After Blue Nile Gains; Geissan Faces Imminent Assault Threat
Mar 30, 2026
UN: Sudan Drone Strikes on Civilians Mark Sharp Increase; Al Sunut Funeral Strike Confirmed
Mar 31, 2026
MSF Report: 3,396 Sexual Violence Survivors Treated in Darfur; RSF Using Rape as Weapon of War
Mar 31, 2026
SAF Reports Repelling Fresh RSF-SPLM-N Attack in Blue Nile; Fighting Continues Near Geissan
Mar 31, 2026
UN World News Brief: 'Deadly Drone Attacks' Underscore Sudan Civilian Crisis
Apr 1, 2026
SAF Drone Strike Kills RSF-Aligned Ta'asees Founder Osama Hassan in Nyala; Near-Miss on RSF Premier
Apr 1, 2026
UN Welcomes Extension of Adré Border Crossing Through June 2026; 2026 Aid Plan Only 16% Funded
Apr 1, 2026
UN: El Obeid Medical Services Suspended, Aid Routes Impassable; Warring Parties Urged to Halt Civilian Attacks
Apr 2, 2026
SAF Repels Major RSF Multi-Front Assault on Dalang, South Kordofan
Apr 2, 2026
SAF General Burhan Reshuffles Top Military Command; Gen. Atta Appointed Chief of Staff
Apr 3, 2026
RSF Drone Strikes Kill 10 at Al-Jabalain Hospital, White Nile State; 7 Medical Staff Among Dead
Apr 4, 2026
MSF Issues Formal Condemnation of Al-Jabalain Hospital Drone Strikes; RSF Also Hit Rabak Medical Depot
Apr 5, 2026
Sudan SAF Military Intelligence Delegation Holds Security Talks with Libya in Tripoli
Apr 5, 2026
RSF-SPLM-N Artillery Shells Dilling Residential Areas; Civilians Killed and Injured
Apr 6, 2026
SAF Repels Large-Scale RSF Ground Assault on Wadi al-Hout, North Kordofan
Apr 7, 2026
Sudanese Political Factions Escalate Boycott of Third Berlin Conference on Sudan
Apr 7, 2026
40,000+ Newly Displaced from El Fasher Area Amid Intensified RSF Attacks
Apr 8, 2026
SAF Consolidates Dilling Breakthrough; Road to North Kordofan Fully Secured After Al-Tukma Operations
Apr 8, 2026
SAF Drone Strike Kills Senior RSF-Allied Paramilitary Commander in Central Darfur
Apr 8, 2026
Berlin Conference Preparatory Talks Finalized for Addis Ababa April 10–12 Amid Deepening Boycott Crisis
Apr 9, 2026
Sudanese Delegates Depart for Addis Ababa Pre-Berlin Preparatory Talks; Boycott Factions Confirm Withdrawal
Apr 9, 2026
African Union Delegation Completes Khartoum Assessment; Recommends Resumption of AU Mission
Apr 9, 2026
Military Sources: 850+ Foreign Mercenaries Backing RSF Including Colombian 'Desert Wolves' Drone Specialists
Apr 10, 2026
Drone Strike on Kutum Wedding Kills at Least 30 Including 17 Children; UN Secretary-General Condemns Attack
Apr 11, 2026
Berlin Conference Addis Ababa Preparatory Talks Enter Day 2; Amnesty Urges Urgent Action as Sudan Approaches Three-Year Mark
Apr 12, 2026
Addis Ababa Preparatory Talks Conclude; Sudan Government Formally Rejects Berlin Conference on Sovereignty Grounds
Apr 12, 2026
Burhan Announces Largest SAF Command Reshuffle of the War: 21 Generals Reassigned
Apr 13, 2026
NGOs: Millions in Sudan Surviving on One Meal a Day as Food Crisis Deepens
Apr 14, 2026
Three babies born into Sudan war every minute, charity warns
Apr 15, 2026
Sudan Enters Fourth Year of War as Officials Describe 'Abandoned Crisis'
Apr 16, 2026
Berlin Conference Pledges €1.3 Billion for Sudan; SAF Government Condemns Process as Sovereignty Violation
Apr 16, 2026
Drone Strikes Kill at Least 44 Civilians in Central Darfur and West Kordofan
Apr 16, 2026
Sudan War Enters Fourth Year with Devastating Toll
Apr 17, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Kill 24+ Civilians in Um Dukhun Market (Central Darfur) and North Kordofan in Single Day
Apr 17, 2026
Nuba Mountains: A Fragile Refuge on Sudan's Front Line
Apr 18, 2026
US Treasury Sanctions Firms Over Colombian Mercenary Recruitment for RSF in Sudan
Apr 19, 2026
SAF Intensifies South Kordofan Offensive Along Kadugli-Delling Road; 100+ Civilians Killed in Delling Since February
Apr 20, 2026
Disgruntled RSF General Defects to SAF After Desert Escape from North Darfur
Apr 20, 2026
Inside Sudan's Only Functioning Tropical Diseases Hospital as Healthcare System Collapses
Apr 20, 2026
Drone Strike Kills Three at Sultan Medical Complex in RSF-Held El Geneina, West Darfur
Apr 20, 2026
Pakistan Suspends $1.5 Billion Sudan Arms Deal After Saudi Arabia Withdraws Financing
Apr 21, 2026
SAF Fourth Infantry Division Recaptures Muqja Station South of Damazin, Pushing Back RSF-SPLM-N Blue Nile Advance
Apr 21, 2026
17 Killed in Community Violence in RSF-Held South Darfur as Inter-Communal Tensions Boil Over
Apr 21, 2026
Three Detainees Die in RSF-Run Daqris Prison; Facility Holds Up to 12,000 People from Multiple States
Apr 22, 2026
UN Relief Chief: 'World Has Failed Sudan' as Civil War Enters Fourth Year; 34 Million Need Aid
Apr 22, 2026
Amnesty International: Three Years On, Warring Parties Intensify Brutal War on Civilians with 700+ Killed in Drone Strikes in Q1 2026
Apr 22, 2026
African Union Delegation Visits Sudan to Assess Conditions for Reopening AU Khartoum Office After 3 Years
Apr 23, 2026
Hemedti Sentences Defected RSF General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam to Death in Absentia After Desert Escape to SAF
Apr 23, 2026
Sudan's Remote Clinics Run Empty as Iran War Disrupts Global Shipping Routes and Medicine Supply Chains
Apr 24, 2026
SAF Launches Coordinated Multi-State Offensive Across 6 States, Claims 10 Tanks and 24 Vehicles Destroyed in 72-Hour Campaign
Apr 24, 2026
RSF Drone Strike Kills 13 in El-Obeid Residential House, Including 8 Children
Apr 24, 2026
Canada Announces New Humanitarian Assistance Package for Sudan as Crisis Enters Fourth Year
Apr 24, 2026
Drone Destroys UNHCR Emergency Shelter Truck in North Darfur, Denying 1,314 Displaced Families Relief
Apr 25, 2026
RSF Drone Strike Kills 7, Wounds 22 in El-Obeid Residential Neighborhoods
Apr 26, 2026
Khartoum Resumes Exhumation of War Victims: 93 Sets of Remains Transferred from Jabra Block 18 and Land Port Terminal
Apr 27, 2026
SAF Drone Strike Kills 6 at Al-Hamidiyah Displacement Camp Near Zalingei, Central Darfur
Apr 27, 2026
Sudan Doctors Network: RSF Detains 2,377 in El Fasher Including 426 Children, 370 Women, 22 Doctors in Deplorable Conditions
Apr 28, 2026
Measles Outbreak Kills 70, Infects 1,000 in Labado Displacement Area, East Darfur Since March 2026
Apr 28, 2026
Fire at Central Darfur Displacement Camp Kills 4 Including Children, Injures 12
Apr 29, 2026
RSF Drone Wave Strikes SAF Military Positions in White Nile State: 18th Infantry Division HQ and Kenana Airbase Targeted
Apr 30, 2026
RSF Drone Strike Kills 27, Wounds 73 at SAF Military Base in Singa During High-Level Commanders' Meeting, Sennar State
May 1, 2026
RSF Drones Strike Jebel Awliya (South Khartoum), El Obeid, and Rahad al-Nuba on May 1, 2026
May 2, 2026
RSF Drone Kills 5 Civilians in Vehicle on Road Toward Omdurman — Jammouiya Triangle, South Khartoum
May 2, 2026
RSF Targeted Drone Strike Kills 9–17 Family Members of Sudan Shield Forces Commander Abu Aqla Kaikal in Al Jazirah State
May 3, 2026
RSF Drone Strikes Kenana Fuel Station and Industrial Complex, White Nile State
May 4, 2026
SAF Airstrike on Balila Market and Water Source Kills 10 in Kurmuk Locality, Blue Nile State
May 4, 2026
Gen. Burhan Visits Kaikal Family Compound in Gezira; Sovereign Council Issues Formal Condemnation of RSF Strike
May 5, 2026
RSF Drone Targets Khartoum International Airport; SAF Air Defenses Intercept, Airport Closed 72 Hours
May 5, 2026
Sudan Accuses UAE and Ethiopia of Orchestrating Khartoum Drone Attacks; Recalls Ambassador, Plans UN Security Council Submission
May 5, 2026
RSF Drones Strike Two Fuel Stations in Kosti, White Nile State; 5 Civilians Killed
May 6, 2026
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, US, EU Condemn Khartoum Airport Drone Attacks; UAE and Ethiopia Deny Involvement
May 7, 2026
Khartoum Airport Remains Closed Day 3; Sudan Pursues UN Security Council Action on Drone Evidence Package
May 7, 2026
RSF Drone Campaign Continues Across Sudan; Near-Daily Strikes Hit SAF-Controlled Areas
May 8, 2026
Sudan Deploys Troops and Anti-Aircraft Systems to Ethiopian Border Zones as Confrontation Escalates
May 8, 2026
UN and UK Condemn RSF Drone Attacks on Khartoum Airport as Closure Enters Fourth Day; Sudan PM Visits Site
May 8, 2026
Sudan War Enters Fourth Year: Analysts Project $34.5B GDP Loss and 34 Million More in Extreme Poverty if Conflict Continues to 2030
May 8, 2026
RSF Drone Strikes Home of Military-Allied Commander Near Khartoum: 15 Killed
May 8, 2026
RSF Drone Strikes Kill 26 Civilians in Al Quz (South Kordofan) and Near El Obeid (North Kordofan)
May 8, 2026
RSF Forces Mass Near Libya-Egypt-Sudan Border Triangle, Signaling Potential New Strategic Axis
May 9, 2026
Khartoum International Airport Reopens: Badr Airlines Resumes Flights After 4-Day RSF Drone-Forced Closure
May 9, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Market in Abu Zaima, North Kordofan: 5 Killed
May 10, 2026
Tarco Aviation and Sudanair Restore Khartoum Flights; First Day Three Sudanese Carriers Simultaneously Serve Capital Since War Began
May 10, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Target RSF Positions in Nyala, South Darfur; First of Two Consecutive Days of Strikes
May 10, 2026
Sudan Civil Aviation Authority: War Has Cost Sudan Over $1 Billion in Aviation Revenue Since April 2023
May 11, 2026
UN Human Rights Chief Issues High Alert: 880 Civilians Killed by Drone Strikes January–April 2026
May 11, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Hit Nyala Second Consecutive Day; RSF Bayraktar Akıncı UCAV Downed Over Nyala Airport
May 12, 2026
Senior RSF Brigadier General El Safana Announces Defection — Third High-Profile Departure in Two Months
May 12, 2026
SAF 4th Infantry Division Retakes Al-Kayli Area Near Kurmuk, Blue Nile State
May 12, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Hit Four Sites in Al-Daein (East Darfur) — RSF Commanders' Residences and Civilian Water Source Targeted
May 13, 2026
SAF Retakes Al-Hamadi (South Kordofan) and Clears Southern Omdurman Neighborhoods in Dual-Front Advance
May 13, 2026
Sudan Declared World's Hungriest Country — Famine Spreading to New Darfur Areas, 19.1 Million at IPC3+
May 13, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes Hit Three Sites in El Geneina, West Darfur — 2+ Killed
May 14, 2026
EU Imposes Sanctions on Seven Sudan Conflict Principals — Hemedti's Brother and SAF-Allied Commander Among Those Blacklisted
May 14, 2026
SAF Airstrikes Hit Al Zorg — Hemedti's Hometown — Killing 64 Civilians, Destroying Hospital
May 14, 2026
SAF Government Formally Returns to Khartoum; Central Bank of Sudan Resumes Capital Operations
May 14, 2026
US House Foreign Affairs Committee Passes Bipartisan RSF Genocide Resolution 44–2, Calls for Terrorist Designation
May 15, 2026
ICG: 'Divided Sudan, Elusive Peace' — Quad Push for 3-Month Humanitarian Truce; SAF Resists Ceasefire Conditions
May 15, 2026
Al Jazeera Fault Lines: 'No Exit From El Fasher' — Documentary Documents RSF Atrocities Post-Siege
May 16, 2026
SAF 4th Infantry Division Recaptures Khor Hassan — Blue Nile State Advance Continues RSF-SPLM-N Rollback
May 16, 2026
IOM: Nearly 50,000 Displaced from Blue Nile State by RSF-SPLM-N Offensive — Displacement Camps Overwhelmed
May 17, 2026
SAF Drone Strikes on Nyala Enter Third Consecutive Day — Al-Masane Weapons Depots Targeted as Hemedti Reported in City
May 17, 2026
WFP/FAO/UNICEF Joint Report: 19.5 Million Face Acute Food Insecurity in Sudan — Famine Risk Persists Despite Lean-Season Warning
May 17, 2026
Washington Post Investigation: Drones Have Transformed Sudan's War — 880+ Civilians Killed in Four Months as Aerial Campaign Intensifies
May 18, 2026
SAF Extends Nyala Aerial Campaign to Fourth Consecutive Day — RSF Soldiers Clash at Central Bank Amid Burhan's Derecognition Order
May 18, 2026
Al-Burhan Issues Executive Order Formally Derecognizing RSF as State Institution — Hemedti's Removal as TSC Deputy Imminent
Source Tier Classification
Tier 1 — Primary/Official
CENTCOM, IDF, White House, IAEA, UN, IRNA, Xinhua official statements
CENTCOM, IDF, White House, IAEA, UN, IRNA, Xinhua official statements
Tier 2 — Major Outlet
Reuters, AP, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Xinhua, CGTN, Bloomberg, WaPo, NYT
Reuters, AP, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Xinhua, CGTN, Bloomberg, WaPo, NYT
Tier 3 — Institutional
Oxford Economics, CSIS, HRW, HRANA, Hengaw, NetBlocks, ICG, Amnesty
Oxford Economics, CSIS, HRW, HRANA, Hengaw, NetBlocks, ICG, Amnesty
Tier 4 — Unverified
Social media, unattributed military claims, unattributed video, diaspora accounts
Social media, unattributed military claims, unattributed video, diaspora accounts
Multi-Pole Sourcing
Events are sourced from four global media perspectives to surface contrasting narratives
W
Western
White House, CENTCOM, IDF, State Dept, Reuters, AP, BBC, CNN, NYT, WaPo
White House, CENTCOM, IDF, State Dept, Reuters, AP, BBC, CNN, NYT, WaPo
ME
Middle Eastern
Al Jazeera, IRNA, Press TV, Tehran Times, Al Arabiya, Al Mayadeen, Fars News
Al Jazeera, IRNA, Press TV, Tehran Times, Al Arabiya, Al Mayadeen, Fars News
E
Eastern
Xinhua, CGTN, Global Times, TASS, Kyodo News, Yonhap
Xinhua, CGTN, Global Times, TASS, Kyodo News, Yonhap
I
International
UN, IAEA, ICRC, HRW, Amnesty, WHO, OPCW, CSIS, ICG
UN, IAEA, ICRC, HRW, Amnesty, WHO, OPCW, CSIS, ICG