42 Active Processes — From Gaza to DRC, Peace Architecture Under Strain

The two-state solution remains the only internationally recognized path to peace. Oslo's framework, though imperfect, is the foundation for a Palestinian state on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as capital. Post-war reconstruction and revived political process can restore viability. The PA and Arab states (Saudi Arabia) insist on a credible state pathway as precondition for normalization.

Israel's current government (Netanyahu coalition) opposes a sovereign Palestinian state and has expanded settlements to 700,000+ settlers making territorial contiguity impossible. Hamas rejects a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, demanding full liberation of historic Palestine. Both spoilers effectively block the Oslo framework from either end.

The JEP has opened groundbreaking accountability cases including the 'false positives' (6,402+ extrajudicial killings by military). FARC demobilized 13,000 fighters. Political participation rights were granted (FARC party won seats). This is the most comprehensive transitional justice framework in the Americas. Progress has been made despite obstacles.

Rural reform (point 1) has barely been implemented. PNIS (crop substitution) funding was cut under Duque and never restored at scale. Over 400 former FARC combatants and thousands of social leaders have been assassinated. The Estado Mayor Central (Mordisco faction) re-armed citing government bad faith. Petro's 'Total Peace' has renegotiated gains without consolidating them.

Ukraine never implemented the political provisions (autonomy for Donbas, constitutional reform) that were central to Minsk II. Ukraine's refusal to engage with Donbas representatives and continued military buildup showed that Kyiv used the agreements to buy time to rearm, not achieve peace. Former German Chancellor Merkel's 2022 statement that Minsk was used to buy time for Ukraine's military confirmed this view.

Russia never fulfilled its security obligations — withdrawing heavy weapons, releasing prisoners, or ensuring OSCE access. Merkel's comments were misrepresented; Minsk was an imperfect framework that Ukraine engaged with under military duress. Russia's 2022 invasion proves it was never interested in Minsk implementation but used it to consolidate territorial gains. Ukraine could not constitutionally grant autonomy under occupation.

Ansar Allah controls most of Yemen's population and is the de facto government of Sanaa and northern Yemen. No durable peace is possible without their full participation. The Saudi-led coalition's blockade and bombing campaign violated international humanitarian law. Houthi Red Sea operations (2024) are a legitimate response to Gaza war. Peace requires recognizing their political reality.

The Houthis are a proxy of Iran that has rejected every UN-mediated peace framework. They have fired ballistic missiles at civilian infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and UAE, used child soldiers, committed torture (per HRW/UN), and refused to implement the Stockholm Agreement on Hodeidah. Red Sea attacks (2024) endanger global commerce and are acts of piracy. Engagement without accountability enables impunity.

The Doha Agreement was the only realistic path to ending 20 years of U.S. military engagement with no prospects for decisive victory. The agreement included Taliban counter-terrorism commitments and intra-Afghan talks. The Afghan government's rapid collapse showed structural weaknesses not caused by the deal. Twenty years of international presence did not create durable state institutions.

The agreement excluded the elected Afghan government and legitimized the Taliban as a state actor before any human rights guarantees. Afghan women's rights activists, civil society, and the urban population were traded away for a U.S. withdrawal timetable. The Taliban immediately reversed women's rights — banning girls' education and work — proving the agreement's human rights provisions were meaningless. The deal prioritized American domestic politics over Afghan lives.

The RSF and its allied militias have committed systematic atrocities in Darfur (mass killings, sexual violence, ethnic targeting) that echo 2003-era genocide. RSF commander Hemeti's forces — which grew out of the Janjaweed — are conducting the same ethnic violence documented by the ICC 20 years ago. The RSF's refusal to negotiate in good faith at Jeddah and its obstruction of humanitarian access make it the primary spoiler.

The SAF launched the April 2023 war by targeting RSF barracks during what was meant to be an integration negotiation. SAF airstrikes have killed civilians across Khartoum and Darfur. The SAF's refusal to engage seriously in AU-mediated talks and its blockade of humanitarian routes also constitutes war criminality. Both parties have committed violations; attributing sole responsibility to RSF enables SAF impunity.

The campaign against Tigray — including deliberate famine, mass rape used as a weapon of war, forced displacement, and targeted killings of ethnic Tigrayans — meets the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Convention. Eritrean forces and Amhara militias participated in ethnic targeting. The UN and U.S. government used the term 'atrocity crimes'. Survivors' testimony documents genocidal intent by perpetrators.

The military operation targeted TPLF combatants who attacked federal military bases on November 4, 2020. The TPLF committed atrocities against Amhara communities, including the Mai-Kadra massacre. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) — a domestic institution — investigated and documented violations by all parties. Applying the genocide label is politically motivated and ignores TPLF atrocities.

UN resolutions since 1965 affirm the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. A referendum promised by the UN Settlement Plan (1991) has been blocked by Morocco for 30 years. The MINURSO mandate explicitly includes holding a referendum. Any solution short of a free, fair plebiscite violates international law. Morocco's 'autonomy' plan is designed to consolidate illegal occupation recognized by no country except the U.S. (2020).

Morocco's Autonomy Plan for the Sahara (2007) — offering substantial self-governance within Moroccan sovereignty — is the only realistic path forward given 30 years of failed referendum preparation. The Polisario is an Algeria-backed proxy with no genuine support among Sahrawis living in Morocco-administered territory. Trump's 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty reflects geopolitical reality. France (2024) and Spain (2022) endorsed the autonomy plan as the 'most serious and credible' basis for talks.

The GFA's Irish dimension — North-South bodies, open border, EU rights for all Northern Irish residents — was underpinned by shared EU membership. Brexit created a hard economic border in the Irish Sea (Windsor Framework) replacing a soft land border, fracturing the constitutional balance of the GFA. The U.S. has warned any breach of the GFA would affect a U.S.-UK trade deal. Irish unification as a constitutional consequence is increasingly discussed.

Brexit was the democratic choice of UK voters and was implemented while maintaining the open land border. The Windsor Framework (2023 renegotiation of the Northern Ireland Protocol) resolves the main trade issues. The GFA institutions — Stormont, North-South Ministerial Council — remain intact. DUP participation in power-sharing restored 2024. British sovereignty is restored without collapsing the peace settlement.

Azerbaijan's 24-hour military operation (Sep 19-20, 2023) and subsequent months of pressure resulted in the departure of virtually the entire ethnic Armenian population (120,000+) — the fastest total population displacement in recent European history. This constitutes ethnic cleansing by definition: a military action that made a territory ethnically homogeneous. The ICJ had issued provisional measures requiring Azerbaijan to maintain humanitarian conditions that were violated.

The military operation was a legal anti-terrorist operation restoring Azerbaijani sovereignty over its own internationally recognized territory. The Armenians chose to leave; Azerbaijan offered citizenship and guarantees. Russia — which bears responsibility as guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians — failed to fulfill its obligations. Armenians who remain are protected. The 1994 Bishkek ceasefire and UN resolutions all affirm Azerbaijani territorial integrity.

Accountability is inseparable from sustainable peace. Amnesties for atrocity crimes violate jus cogens norms and leave survivors without redress, sowing seeds for future conflict. The Sierra Leone Special Court, Colombia JEP, and Rwandan Gacaca courts show that differentiated accountability processes can be designed to support peace. Impunity guarantees recurrence — Uganda's LRA peace collapse shows the risks of promising amnesty.

ICC indictments of leaders mid-negotiation (Bashir, Kenyatta, Mladic) complicate or destroy peace processes. Joseph Kony refused to sign the Juba agreement citing ICC fears. In many contexts, accountability demands are used by spoilers to avoid demobilization. Traditional justice mechanisms, time-limited immunities, and graduated accountability systems have empirically produced more durable settlements than maximalist accountability demands.

The 4.5 formula — distributing power among four major clans with 0.5 share for minorities — is the pragmatic foundation that has kept Somalia's peace process alive since 2000. It provides every major actor a stake in the political system, preventing the total exclusion that drove warlordism. It enabled democratic elections (one-person-one-vote) in Mogadishu in 2017. Without inclusive clan representation, no Somali government survives.

The 4.5 formula institutionalizes clan identity as the primary political currency, preventing civic nationalism and merit-based governance. Minority groups (Bantu, Benadiri, Bajuni) are permanently marginalized with half a share despite historical presence. The formula creates incentives for clan mobilization rather than policy development and entrenches the elite clan networks that have perpetuated conflict. It should be phased out as state capacity grows.

The Government of National Unity (GNU) led by Prime Minister Dbeibeh is the UN-recognized government, endorsed by the UNSMIL-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum in 2021. Haftar's LNA operates as a military force backed by Russia, UAE, and Egypt outside of any democratic mandate. International legitimacy and UNSC resolutions support the GNU. Talks should proceed on the basis of existing recognized institutions supplemented by elections.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's LNA controls eastern Libya, oil fields, and the majority of Libyan territory. The Government of National Stability (GNS) in Benghazi has a House of Representatives mandate. GNU elections planned for Dec 2021 were never held, removing their democratic legitimacy. Any durable peace requires power-sharing that reflects territorial and military realities including LNA. Haftar's partners (Russia, UAE) won't accept being excluded.

The Myanmar junta (SAC) took power in an illegal coup (Feb 1, 2021), dissolved the elected government, and has committed systematic atrocities including aerial bombing of civilians. Engaging the junta legitimizes the coup and undermines the pro-democracy movement. ASEAN's five-point consensus has been ignored by the junta for three years. International recognition and support should go to the NUG (National Unity Government), which represents the Feb 2020 electoral mandate.

The junta controls the army and key territory. No peace process succeeds without engaging the party holding military power. ASEAN's non-interference principle allows engagement without endorsement. China — Myanmar's most important neighbor — requires working-level contacts with the SAC to protect its economic interests and border stability. A purely sanctions-and-isolation approach has not worked in 40+ years of Myanmar authoritarianism.

Colombia's history shows piecemeal peace fails — the M-19 accord, the 1991 Constitution process, and the FARC deal all show each negotiated group that demobilizes expands space for remaining armed actors. Petro's Total Peace — engaging ELN, FARC dissidents (EMC), AGC/Clan del Golfo, and criminal organizations simultaneously — is the only comprehensive approach. Security reforms must accompany negotiations. Cuba/Norway/Venezuela guarantors provide continuity.

Total Peace is strategically incoherent because it treats criminal organizations (AGC) the same as political insurgents (ELN), giving drug traffickers political leverage without genuine disarmament. ELN and FARC-EMC have violated ceasefires while benefiting from reduced military pressure. Venezuela's Maduro as 'guarantor' is a conflict of interest given Venezuela's support for ELN. The strategy has not reduced violence and risks legitimizing groups that should face criminal prosecution.