DRC and M23 Agree Peace Roadmap as Fighting Widens in Fizi, Minembwe and Walungu

Killed, eastern DRC since Jan 2025 7,000+
Internally displaced persons (nationwide) 5.8M
Goma control status M23-held since Jan 27, 2025
Rubaya coltan mine control M23/AFC-taxed since Apr 2024
DRC v. Rwanda ICJ case status Admissible — merits phase
Washington Accords status Signed Jun 27, 2025; ratified Dec 4, 2025
Doha comprehensive peace deal target Summer 2026
LATESTAug 22, 2026 · 6 events
03

Military Operations

Jan 27–Aug 7
  • Capture of Goma
    M23, with Rwandan special-forces support per UN experts, seized Goma on Jan 27, 2025 after cutting the city's two access roads — the war's single deadliest event, with UN estimates near 3,000 dead.
    Jan 27, 2025T2
  • Capture of Bukavu
    M23 took the South Kivu capital on Feb 16, 2025 with almost no FARDC resistance, extending rebel control over both Kivu provincial capitals.
    Feb 16, 2025T2
  • Capture of Walikale
    M23's furthest westward advance of the campaign, taken Mar 19-20, 2025 after seizing Kashebere and Kibati.
    Mar 20, 2025T2
  • Seizure of Kalehe Mineral Towns
    M23 took the cassiterite trading towns of Nyabibwe, Numbi and Lumbishi in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, expanding control over tin-ore supply chains.
    Feb 2025T3
  • Capture of Uvira
    AFC/M23's biggest advance since February 2025 — the Lake Tanganyika port fell Dec 10, 2025 after fighting for Sange, Luberizi, Luvungi and Kamanyola, in direct breach of the Doha ceasefire.
    Dec 10, 2025T2
  • Rubaya Coltan Taxation Regime
    Since seizing Rubaya in April 2024, M23 has taxed roughly 120 tonnes/month of coltan trade at ~15% of value, earning at least $800,000/month — the conflict's core financing mechanism.
    Ongoing since Apr 2024T2
  • M23 Counteroffensive in Masisi
    After FARDC-Wazalendo forces retook villages around Katoyi in Feb 2026, M23 pushed back near Kashovu and Lumbishi and recaptured lost ground within days, collapsing the Angolan ceasefire proposal.
    Feb 22-Mar 2, 2026T3
  • M23 Expels Verification Mechanism Member
    M23 expelled a Congolese government representative from the joint ceasefire verification mechanism even as a prisoner exchange proceeded, undercutting the Washington/Doha monitoring architecture.
    Aug 7, 2026T3
04

Humanitarian Impact

Casualty figures by category with source tiers and contested status
CategoryKilledInjuredSourceTierStatusNote
Goma battle (Jan-Feb 2025) ~787-2,900 ~2,958 WHO / UN officials Official Heavily Contested Early WHO tally of 787 dead rose to a UN estimate of nearly 3,000 as bodies were recovered from streets and morgues through February 2025.
Eastern DRC, since Jan 1, 2025 7,000+ not separately reported PM Judith Suminwa, DRC government Official Evolving Government tally given to parliament Feb 24, 2025; roughly 3,000 of the deaths were attributed to Goma alone.
SAMIDRC / MONUSCO peacekeepers, Goma battle ~20 SAMIDRC (13-17 South African) + 3 MONUSCO (2 South African, 1 Uruguayan) not fully reported SANDF / UN Official Verified Losses that led directly to the Mar 13, 2025 SADC decision to terminate the SAMIDRC mandate.
Munzenze prison break, Goma 100+ (reported) unknown Contemporary press reporting Institutional Heavily Contested Reports that over 100 female inmates were raped and burned alive amid chaos as M23 fighters entered Goma on Jan 27, 2025; casualty figures for this specific incident remain difficult to independently verify.
Komanda church massacre 38-43 dozens Al Jazeera / Human Rights Watch Major Partial ADF/ISCAP attack on a night vigil at Saint Anuarite Catholic church, Jul 27, 2025; toll estimates ranged 38-50 across early reports.
Rubaya mine landslide 227 confirmed, 400+ reported unknown, many unrecovered Al Jazeera / local officials Major Heavily Contested Two landslides on Jan 28-29, 2026 buried artisanal miners; the toll rose from an initial 227 confirmed dead past 400 within days, with recovery hampered by mud.
Internally displaced persons, nationwide n/a n/a UNHCR / OCHA Official Verified IDPs stood near 5 million in early 2025 before falling to roughly 5.8 million-adjusted estimates in 2026 as ~1.9 million returnees were recorded, mostly in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri.
Total displaced (IDPs + refugees), 2025 peak n/a n/a UNHCR Official Verified Conflict displaced 9.7 million people within the DRC in 2025, the country's highest figure on record and nearly a third of the global total that year.
Population in humanitarian need, 2026 n/a n/a OCHA Official Verified OCHA projected 14.9 million people would need humanitarian assistance in 2026, with food insecurity affecting 28 million nationwide.
Masisi offensive and counteroffensive, Feb-Mar 2026 not comprehensively reported not comprehensively reported Critical Threats Project Institutional Contested Multiple days of village-by-village fighting between FARDC-Wazalendo and M23 forces; casualty figures were not consolidated by any single tracked source.
Civilians killed since December 2025 (post-framework) 1,500+ hundreds of thousands displaced Independent analyst estimate cited in regional press Institutional Contested Cited as evidence that the Doha framework and Washington Accords lack enforcement mechanisms, despite successive ceasefire pledges.
Boga and Tchabi massacres (historical baseline) 57+ 47+ Contemporary press reporting Major Partial May 30-31, 2021 ISCAP attack pre-dating this tracker's window, included as baseline context for the ADF/ISCAP campaign against civilians in Ituri.
Fizi Mwalu Hotel drone strike (Aug 19, 2026) 0 2 (incl. hotel manager) Radio Okapi / FARDC Sukola 2 sector Major Contested FARDC attributes the strike to Rwandan-piloted drones targeting a civilian hotel; Rwanda and M23 have not confirmed responsibility, and the account has not been independently verified.
05

Economic & Market Impact

DRC GDP (2026 projection) ▲ +
$123B
Source: World Bank / IMF-linked projections
Real GDP growth, 2025 ▼ moderated from 2024
5.5%
Source: World Bank MPO / AICS
Cobalt exports share of GDP (2026 est.) ▲ rising
20%+
Source: Farmonaut / World Bank cobalt market analysis
Copper production growth, 2024 ▲ driven by Kamoa-Kakula
+12.1%
Source: World Bank / DRC mining statistics
Cobalt production growth, 2024 ▲ despite 2025 export ban
+30.1%
Source: World Bank / DRC mining statistics
2025 cobalt export ban duration ▼ Feb-Oct 2025
8 months
Source: Discovery Alert / DRC Ministry of Mines
Current account deficit, 2025 ▲ widened by export ban
3.7% of GDP
Source: World Bank MPO
M23 monthly coltan tax revenue at Rubaya ▲ ~15% levy on traders
$800,000+
Source: Reuters, via The Africa Report
Rubaya monthly coltan trade volume ▲ under M23 taxation
120 tonnes
Source: Reuters, via The Africa Report
US-DRC Strategic Minerals Partnership ▲ preferential access: cobalt, copper, coltan
Signed Dec 4, 2025
Source: US Department of State / AllAfrica
06

Contested Claims Matrix

21 claims · click to expand
Are Rwandan troops fighting alongside M23 in eastern DRC?
Source A: DRC / UN Group of Experts
UN experts and Kinshasa say Rwandan special forces command and fight alongside M23, providing weapons, reinforcements and command-and-control that made the 2025 Goma and Bukavu offensives possible.
Source B: Rwandan Government
Kigali denies deploying offensive forces in the DRC, framing any military posture as defensive measures against the FDLR and a genocidal threat on its border, and casts M23 as an indigenous Congolese Tutsi rebellion.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Multiple independent UN Group of Experts reports have documented Rwandan military involvement; Rwanda continues to reject this characterization publicly even after signing the Washington Accords, which require Rwandan force disengagement.
How many people died in the January 2025 battle for Goma?
Source A: Early WHO/hospital count
An early tally based on hospital and morgue records put deaths at 787 with about 2,958 injured as of Jan 31, 2025.
Source B: Later UN estimate
UN officials later said the toll was closer to 3,000, citing roughly 2,000 bodies retrieved from city streets and 900 more counted in hospital morgues.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The wide gap reflects the chaos of active urban combat; both figures are cited by credible sources, and the true toll — including undiscovered dead — is likely higher than either count.
Is M23 a Rwandan proxy force or an indigenous Congolese rebellion?
Source A: DRC Government
Kinshasa describes M23 as a Rwandan proxy created and sustained to control Congolese territory and minerals, citing UN evidence of Rwandan command support.
Source B: M23/AFC Leadership
Bertrand Bisimwa has said the group is "waging an existential war" for the survival of Congolese Tutsi communities it says face discrimination and violence, denying it is a Rwandan puppet.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Independent UN reporting supports significant Rwandan state backing, while M23's leadership and rank-and-file include genuine Congolese Tutsi grievances predating the current campaign — both dynamics coexist.
Does the FDLR still pose a serious security threat to Rwanda?
Source A: Rwandan Government
Kigali says the FDLR remains an active, armed genocidal threat embedded in Congolese territory and argues the Washington Accords require its forcible neutralization within 90 days, not negotiated cantonment.
Source B: DRC Government / FDLR faction
Kinshasa negotiated a DDR protocol directly with an FDLR faction in July 2025, and the group argues it has been diminished for years and that its fighters should only return to Rwanda voluntarily.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Rwanda formally rejected the DRC-FDLR protocol in 2026 as inconsistent with the Accords' Concept of Operations, leaving the FDLR's disarmament the central unresolved issue blocking full implementation as of August 2026.
Who broke the Angolan-proposed February 2026 ceasefire?
Source A: DRC Government
Kinshasa says it agreed in principle to President Lourenço's proposal and accuses M23 of violating the truce by continuing operations in Masisi.
Source B: M23/AFC
M23 says it was never properly consulted on the Angolan proposal and remained committed solely to the Doha process, framing the FARDC-Wazalendo Masisi offensive as the actual breach.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Both sides publicly accused each other of violations within days of the proposed ceasefire date; the initiative collapsed without a functioning verification mechanism to establish responsibility.
Is Rwanda systematically smuggling Congolese coltan into its export chain?
Source A: UN Group of Experts
A July 2025 UN report found Rwanda smuggled Rubaya-origin coltan into its own supply chain at "unprecedented levels," blending it with domestic production before export to global electronics buyers.
Source B: Rwandan Government
Rwanda maintains its mineral exports reflect legitimate domestic production and trade, and disputes characterizations of large-scale conflict-mineral laundering.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Multiple independent bodies, including Global Witness and the UN Group of Experts, have documented smuggling routes and volumes; Rwanda has not accepted these findings.
Is Félix Tshisekedi's presidency legitimate?
Source A: DRC Government
Kinshasa asserts Tshisekedi's December 2023 re-election was constitutional and legitimate, and treats challenges to his rule as part of the AFC/M23 insurgency's broader aims.
Source B: Corneille Nangaa / AFC
Nangaa, the AFC coordinator, has said Tshisekedi "never won the election" and that overthrowing his government is among the coalition's objectives.
⚖ RESOLUTION: International observers largely recognized the 2023 election process despite irregularities; the legitimacy dispute remains a core AFC/M23 political demand rather than a settled factual question.
Is the US-brokered peace process primarily about minerals access or genuine conflict resolution?
Source A: Trump Administration
US officials frame the Washington Accords and the December 2025 Strategic Partnership Agreement as linked: security guarantees enabling investment, and investment underwriting durable peace.
Source B: Critics / Regional Analysts
Critics argue the administration prioritized securing preferential US access to Congolese cobalt, copper and coltan, and that the peace framework lacks enforcement mechanisms strong enough to stop continued fighting.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Both elements are documented in the public record — the mineral partnership and peace accord were negotiated on parallel, linked tracks — while continued 2026 ceasefire violations support critics' enforcement concerns.
Does the ICJ have jurisdiction to hear DRC's case against Rwanda?
Source A: DRC Government
Kinshasa argues the ICJ must hear claims of grave breaches of the Genocide Convention and other treaties regardless of Rwanda's reservations, given the scale of alleged atrocities over three decades.
Source B: Rwandan Government
Rwanda challenged the court's jurisdiction, consistent with its successful jurisdictional defense in a prior 2002 DRC filing that was dismissed.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The ICJ rejected Rwanda's jurisdictional challenge and ruled the case admissible on Jun 26, 2026, moving it to the merits phase — a reversal of the outcome in DRC's 2002 attempt.
How many Rwandan troops are/were deployed in eastern DRC?
Source A: UN / Western officials
Various UN and Western assessments through 2025 estimated several thousand Rwandan troops operating in North and South Kivu alongside M23.
Source B: Rwandan Government
Rwanda disputes large-scale troop presence figures and frames any personnel in the region as limited defensive measures.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Independent verification is difficult given denied access; the Washington Accords' requirement that Rwanda disengage and withdraw forces implicitly acknowledges a troop presence requiring removal.
Should demobilized FDLR fighters be forcibly repatriated to Rwanda?
Source A: Rwandan Government
Kigali wants demobilized FDLR combatants repatriated to Rwanda as part of the group's dissolution, consistent with the Washington Accords' CONOPS timeline.
Source B: FDLR faction / DRC negotiators
The FDLR faction that signed the July 2025 protocol says current conditions do not allow safe return to Rwanda and insists repatriation must be voluntary, with international guarantees.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The dispute over forced versus voluntary repatriation remains unresolved: the DRC's DDR plan presented to the sixth JSCM meeting in Geneva (Aug 12-13, 2026) conditions disarmament on secure, internationally guaranteed sites and rejects forced extradition, which Rwanda has called a delaying tactic, while the Great Lakes Contact Group continues to press Kinshasa for a concrete operational timeline.
Are Wazalendo fighters legitimate self-defense militias or undisciplined armed actors?
Source A: DRC Government / Wazalendo
Kinshasa and Wazalendo leaders describe the militias as necessary community self-defense forces filling gaps left by a weakened FARDC.
Source B: M23/AFC and critics
M23-aligned commentary argues Wazalendo groups are labeled 'civilians' or 'defenders' when retreating but are accused of attacking civilians when on the offensive, alleging a double standard in how the militias are described.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Human rights monitors have documented abuses by armed actors on multiple sides of the conflict, including some Wazalendo factions, complicating any single characterization.
What caused the January 2026 Rubaya mine landslide?
Source A: Geological assessments
Analysts point to heavy rains triggering landslides in unstable, poorly engineered artisanal pits as the immediate technical cause.
Source B: Labor rights advocates
Groups including the ITUC-Africa argue the deeper cause is unsafe mining practices driven by armed-group taxation pressure to maximize output regardless of safety standards.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Both technical and structural causes are widely cited together; no single authoritative government inquiry into the disaster's root cause had concluded publicly as of August 2026.
Does the November 2025 Doha Framework represent real progress toward peace?
Source A: African Union / Qatar
The AU welcomed the framework as a breakthrough addressing the conflict's root causes across eight chapters, with a comprehensive deal targeted for summer 2026.
Source B: Regional Security Analysts
Analysts including the Critical Threats Project describe "a long road ahead," noting M23 made no firm disarmament commitments and continued territorial advances (Uvira, Dec 2025) after signing.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The framework created a structured negotiating track that produced further diplomatic meetings through mid-2026, but ceasefire violations and the unresolved FDLR dispute show implementation lagging well behind the framework's ambitions.
Were the January 2025 Kinshasa protests and embassy attacks a legitimate expression of public anger?
Source A: Protesters / opposition voices
Demonstrators said the attacks on the Rwandan and allied embassies reflected justified outrage at the government's failure to prevent Goma's fall and at perceived Rwandan aggression.
Source B: DRC Government / diplomatic missions
The government and targeted embassies condemned the violence and looting as unlawful and diplomatically damaging, regardless of the underlying grievance.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Both the underlying public anger and the illegality of the embassy attacks are acknowledged in contemporary reporting; no comprehensive prosecution outcome has been widely reported.
Did the SAMIDRC mission fail in its defense of Goma?
Source A: Critics / SADC member publics
Critics point to SAMIDRC's inability to prevent Goma's fall and its own significant casualties as evidence the mission failed its core protection mandate.
Source B: SADC
SADC framed the phased withdrawal as an orderly, dignified conclusion to a mission that operated under extremely difficult conditions against a better-equipped, externally backed adversary.
⚖ RESOLUTION: SADC terminated the mission's mandate just over six weeks after Goma fell, a timeline critics read as an implicit acknowledgment that the deployment could not achieve its objectives.
Did the DRC's 2025 cobalt export ban help or harm the country's economy?
Source A: DRC Ministry of Mines
The government said the four-month-then-extended ban would arrest a collapse in global cobalt prices and give Kinshasa more leverage to negotiate value-added processing deals.
Source B: Mining industry / market analysts
Analysts noted the eight-month suspension widened the DRC's current account deficit to 3.7% of GDP in 2025 even as copper exports continued to grow, arguing it deterred near-term investment.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The ban was lifted in October 2025 after eight months; both price-stabilization gains and fiscal costs are documented in subsequent economic reporting.
Does the US-DRC minerals partnership fairly benefit Congolese interests?
Source A: DRC Government
Kinshasa presents the December 2025 Strategic Partnership Agreement as a security-linked investment win, tying US commercial interest to enforcement of the Washington Accords.
Source B: Civil society critics
Critics argue preferential access agreements negotiated amid an active conflict risk locking in terms that favor US companies over Congolese revenue capture and worker protections, echoing long-standing criticism of DRC mineral concessions.
⚖ RESOLUTION: The partnership's specific commercial terms were not fully public as of August 2026, making an independent assessment of its distributional fairness difficult to verify.
Can Rubaya be legitimately 'formalized' for US investment while M23 controls it militarily?
Source A: DRC Government
Kinshasa added Rubaya to a US strategic minerals shortlist in February 2026, arguing formal investment and traceability programs are a path to displacing rebel taxation with legitimate revenue.
Source B: Transparency advocates
Groups like Global Witness warn that any deal over a site under active M23 taxation risks legitimizing conflict-mineral financing unless rebel control is first ended.
⚖ RESOLUTION: As of August 2026, M23 continued to tax Rubaya's coltan trade even as formalization talks proceeded, leaving the practical question of sequencing (control before investment, or vice versa) unresolved.
Are ADF/ISCAP attacks primarily ideological (Islamic State-aligned) or a reaction to military pressure?
Source A: MONUSCO / regional security analysts
Analysts link the July 2025 surge in ADF attacks on Christian congregations to reprisals for the joint UPDF-FARDC Operation Shujaa's pressure on ADF's Madina camp.
Source B: ADF/ISCAP's own claims
The group, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2019, frames its attacks within an explicitly jihadist, sectarian ideological campaign rather than as tactical retaliation alone.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Security analysts generally treat the two explanations as complementary rather than exclusive: an ideologically motivated group escalating in response to specific military pressure.
Who is responsible for the August 2026 drone strikes on civilian sites in Fizi and Minembwe?
Source A: FARDC / DRC Government
FARDC's Sukola 2 South Kivu sector says drones that struck the Mwalu Hotel in Fizi on Aug 19, 2026 were piloted from Rwanda, calling it a civilian-target violation of the Washington Accords.
Source B: M23 Spokesman Lawrence Kanyuka
M23 says bombings in the Minembwe highlands during the same period "caused civilian casualties and significant damage to civilian infrastructure," implicitly pointing to pro-government or coalition strikes rather than M23/RDF action.
⚖ RESOLUTION: Neither side's civilian-harm attribution had been independently verified as of Aug 23, 2026; both incidents occurred in the same South Kivu highlands corridor days before the first EJVM+ ceasefire verification mission was due in Minembwe.
07

Political & Diplomatic

FT
Félix Tshisekedi
President of the DRC
cd-gov
Tshisekedi pledged "deep gratitude and clear hope" for the region's future at the Dec 4, 2025 Washington Accords signing ceremony, committing to honor the agreement's terms.
JS
Judith Suminwa Tuluka
Prime Minister of the DRC
cd-gov
Told parliament on Feb 24, 2025 that more than 7,000 people had been killed in fighting in eastern DRC since the start of the year.
TK
Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner
Minister of Foreign Affairs, DRC
cd-gov
Led DRC's foreign-ministry delegation through the Washington Accords and Doha framework negotiating tracks across 2025.
PM
Patrick Muyaya
Minister of Communication and Media / Government Spokesperson, DRC
cd-gov
Serves as the Tshisekedi government's principal public voice on the conflict, ceasefire negotiations and peace-process developments.
CN
Corneille Nangaa
Coordinator, Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)
m23
"We will even continue our advance towards Kinshasa until the Tshisekedi government resolves our problems." On his own role forming the M23-led coalition: "If I created the monster, I think it belongs to me to undo it."
BB
Bertrand Bisimwa
President, M23
m23
"We are waging an existential war because the Congolese government is subjecting part of its population to death."
WN
Willy Ngoma
Military Spokesman, M23 (killed Feb 24, 2026)
m23
A veteran M23 member who served as the group's public military voice until he was killed in a FARDC drone strike near Rubaya during the Feb 2026 Masisi counteroffensive.
MB
Seka Musa Baluku
Leader, ADF / Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)
adf
Leads the ADF faction that pledged bay'ah to the Islamic State in 2019 and has since carried out attacks on civilian and Christian targets in Ituri and North Kivu under the ISCAP banner.
PK
Paul Kagame
President of Rwanda
rw-gov
"We have seen countless mediations and efforts, but none has succeeded in resolving the underlying issues. President Trump introduced a new and effective dynamism that created the space for breakthroughs... We have the clearest and most viable path forward that we have ever had."
ON
Olivier Nduhungirehe
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rwanda
rw-gov
Signed the Washington Accords on behalf of Rwanda's foreign ministry track alongside DRC counterparts on Jun 27, 2025.
JK
Gen. James Kabarebe
Senior Defense and Security Adviser to the President, Rwanda
rw-gov
Sanctioned by the US Treasury in Feb 2025 over Rwanda's support for M23 operations in eastern DRC.
VK
Gen. Vincent Karusisi
Rwandan military official
rw-gov
Sanctioned by the EU in Mar 2025 for his role in supporting abuses linked to the conflict in eastern DRC.
AG
António Guterres
UN Secretary-General
UN / Intl
The UN Secretariat has repeatedly urged all parties to respect ceasefire commitments while warning that MONUSCO's mandate renewal must be matched by a gradual, conditions-based drawdown.
BK
Bintou Keita
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the DRC / MONUSCO Chief
UN / Intl
Has repeatedly briefed the Security Council urging the parties to "stay the course towards durable peace," warning that violence continues in the east despite the ceasefire accord.
GE
UN Group of Experts on the DRC
UN Security Council-mandated monitoring panel
UN / Intl
Documented in its Jul 2025 report that Rwanda supported M23 militarily and smuggled Congolese coltan at "unprecedented levels."
MB
Massad Boulos
US Senior Adviser for Africa
World Leader
Led the Trump administration's shuttle diplomacy that laid the groundwork for both the Washington Accords and the December 2025 US-DRC minerals partnership.
MR
Marco Rubio
US Secretary of State
World Leader
Hosted the Dec 4, 2025 Washington Accords signing ceremony on behalf of the US government, with the bilateral instruments signed under his auspices.
DT
Donald Trump
President of the United States
World Leader
Witnessed the formal Dec 4, 2025 signing of the Washington Accords by Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi at the White House, after his administration made the DRC-Rwanda conflict its first African peace initiative.
JL
João Lourenço
President of Angola
World Leader
Proposed a Feb 2026 ceasefire as a follow-on to his earlier role as African Union mediator, though the initiative collapsed within days after M23 said it had not been properly consulted.
QA
Government of Qatar (Doha Mediation Team)
Mediator, Doha peace track
World Leader
Hosted and brokered the Jul 2025 Declaration of Principles and the Nov 2025 Doha Framework for Comprehensive Peace between the DRC government and AFC/M23.
01

Historical Timeline

2025 – Present
MilitaryDiplomaticHumanitarianEconomicActive
The Fall of Goma and Bukavu (Jan–Feb 2025)
Jan 23–26, 2025
M23 Cuts Roads, Encircles Goma
Jan 27–28, 2025
M23 Captures Goma, Provincial Capital of North Kivu
Jan 28, 2025
Protests and Embassy Attacks Rock Kinshasa Over Goma's Fall
Feb 2025
UN: Death Toll From Goma Battle Nears 3,000
Feb 9–13, 2025
M23 Forces Closure of Goma-Area IDP Camps
Feb 16, 2025
M23 Captures Bukavu, Capital of South Kivu
Feb 24, 2025
PM Suminwa: 7,000 Killed in Eastern DRC Since January
Feb 27, 2025
Bombing at M23 Rally Kills Several in Bukavu
Sanctions, Walikale, and the SAMIDRC Withdrawal (Mar–May 2025)
Mar 17, 2025
EU Sanctions Rwandan Officials and M23 Leaders
Mar 13, 2025
SADC Summit Ends SAMIDRC Mission, Orders Withdrawal
Mar 19–20, 2025
M23 Captures Walikale, Its Furthest Westward Advance
Apr 29, 2025
SADC Begins Phased Withdrawal of SAMIDRC Troops
Mar 2025
Qatar Opens Direct Talks Between DRC Government and M23
The Washington Accords and Doha Ceasefire (Jun–Aug 2025)
Jun 27, 2025
DRC and Rwanda Sign Washington Accords
Jul 4, 2025
UN Experts: Rwanda Coltan Smuggling at "Unprecedented Levels"
Jul 19, 2025
DRC and M23 Sign Doha Declaration of Principles
Jul 27, 2025
ADF Kills 38–43 Civilians in Komanda Church Attack
Jul 28, 2025
FDLR Faction Signs Disarmament Protocol
The Doha Framework and Minerals Deal (Sep–Dec 2025)
Oct 2025
DRC Lifts Eight-Month Cobalt Export Ban
Nov 15, 2025
DRC and AFC/M23 Sign Doha Framework for Comprehensive Peace
Dec 4, 2025
US and DRC Sign Strategic Minerals Partnership
Dec 4, 2025
Kagame and Tshisekedi Formally Sign Washington Accords
Dec 10, 2025
AFC/M23 Captures Uvira, South Kivu's Southern Gateway
Dec 20, 2025
UN Security Council Extends MONUSCO Mandate to December 2026
Disaster at Rubaya and Renewed Fighting (Jan–Apr 2026)
Jan 28–29, 2026
Landslide Kills Over 200 at Rubaya Coltan Mine
Feb 18, 2026
DRC Adds Rubaya to US Strategic Minerals Shortlist
Feb 2026
Angolan-Proposed Ceasefire Collapses Within Days
Feb 16–20, 2026
FARDC-Wazalendo Launch Masisi Offensive
Feb 24, 2026
FARDC Drone Strike Kills M23 Military Spokesman
Feb 22–Mar 2, 2026
M23 Counterattacks, Recaptures Masisi Villages
Mar 2–3, 2026
US Sanctions Rwandan Army and Four Senior Commanders
ICJ Case and Fragile Diplomacy (May–Aug 2026)
Jan 2026
OCHA: 14.9 Million People Need Humanitarian Aid in 2026
Jun 26, 2026
DRC Files Case Against Rwanda at the ICJ
Jul 2026
Rwanda Rejects DRC's FDLR Disarmament Protocol
Jul 2026
African Union Adopts Six-Month Peace Roadmap
Jul 24, 2026
Washington Accords Joint Oversight Committee Meets in Paris
Aug 14, 2026
Great Lakes Contact Group Presses DRC on FDLR Protocol
Aug 7, 2026
Prisoner Exchange Held as Wazalendo-M23 Clash Near Kavumu
Aug 13, 2026
DRC and Rwanda Hold Sixth JSCM Meeting in Geneva, Set October Planning Conference
Aug 17, 2026
AFC/M23-Wazalendo Fighting Spreads From Kalehe Into Masisi
Aug 13-21, 2026
Fighting Widens Across Kalehe, Masisi and Walungu as M23 Recaptures Ziralo
Aug 19, 2026
Drone Strikes Hit Mwalu Hotel in Fizi-Centre, Wounding Two Civilians
Aug 20, 2026
FARDC Downs RDF/M23-Twirwaneho Drone Near Runyengo in the Fizi Highlands
Aug 17-21, 2026
Pro-Government Forces and M23-Allied Twirwaneho Clash in the Minembwe Highlands
Aug 22, 2026
DRC and M23 Agree Roadmap for Doha Peace Talks, Set Aug 24 EJVM+ Verification Mission
Source Tier Classification
Tier 1 — Primary/Official
CENTCOM, IDF, White House, IAEA, UN, IRNA, Xinhua official statements
Tier 2 — Major Outlet
Reuters, AP, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Xinhua, CGTN, Bloomberg, WaPo, NYT
Tier 3 — Institutional
Oxford Economics, CSIS, HRW, HRANA, Hengaw, NetBlocks, ICG, Amnesty
Tier 4 — Unverified
Social media, unattributed military claims, unattributed video, diaspora accounts
Multi-Pole Sourcing
Events are sourced from four global media perspectives to surface contrasting narratives
W
Western
White House, CENTCOM, IDF, State Dept, Reuters, AP, BBC, CNN, NYT, WaPo
ME
Middle Eastern
Al Jazeera, IRNA, Press TV, Tehran Times, Al Arabiya, Al Mayadeen, Fars News
E
Eastern
Xinhua, CGTN, Global Times, TASS, Kyodo News, Yonhap
I
International
UN, IAEA, ICRC, HRW, Amnesty, WHO, OPCW, CSIS, ICG