Campaña de drones del FLA persiste en Kidal; emboscadas con IED del JNIM continúan en ruta de Tombuctú; Traoré consolida bloque autoritario AES hasta 2029

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved — junta blocked MINUSMA investigation; Russia and China blocked UNSC action. ICC review requested; no prosecutions as of 2026.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Not formally determined — access restrictions prevented forensic investigation. US Treasury sanctioned Wagner Mali leader Ivan Maslov in May 2022. No prosecutions.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Contested — territorial gain in Kidal acknowledged; independent analysts and ACLED data show record violence and expanding jihadist control across the broader theater.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Deeply contested. Violence statistics show expansion during Barkhane's tenure; counterfactual (what would have happened without intervention?) is unresolvable.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Mandate terminated June 30, 2023. Violence has escalated dramatically since MINUSMA's departure, challenging the junta's narrative that the mission itself caused insecurity.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Definitively answered: FAMa/Africa Corps lost Kidal on April 26, 2026 — less than 17 months after its recapture. FLA forces seized the city during the April 25–26 JNIM-FLA nationwide offensive; Africa Corps and FAMa withdrew under FLA escort; FLA declared Kidal 'totally' under its control. The 'Pyrrhic victory' framing proved accurate. Kidal's rapid fall also eliminated the junta's primary security success narrative.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Contested — Bazoum remains detained without charge. Niger's security has deteriorated since the coup per ACLED data. ECOWAS intervention threat dropped.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Government disbanded Dan Nan Ambassagou officially in March 2019 but did not enforce the ban. A second Ogossagou attack in February 2020 killed 35 more. No perpetrators prosecuted.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved — Malian intelligence reportedly engaged JNIM intermediaries in 2025 while officially denying all talks. JNIM's blockade of Bamako tightens state leverage erosion.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unconfirmed — no official admission. JNIM blockade continues as of early 2026; no visible reduction in JNIM operations.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Contested — no neutral ground mapping authority accepted by all parties. JNIM's blockade of key supply arteries provides indirect evidence of near-complete rural control.

⚖ RESOLUTION: No accountability proceedings initiated. Junta suspended domestic media coverage; international access to the area remains restricted.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Operational continuity is well-documented. The institutional distinction is real but has not produced observable changes in conduct in Mali.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Dissolved December 2023. No successor regional security body has emerged. The AES's own Unified Force inaugurated December 2025.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Accord is effectively dead following the November 2023 Kidal offensive and MINUSMA's dissolution, which was the accord's primary monitoring mechanism.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved — a structural driver of the conflict. No formal accountability for collective punishment incidents. Pattern documented across a decade of ACLED data.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Contested — JNIM effectively controls access to large areas. The question of whether 'control' requires formal governance or mere security dominance divides analysts.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Operations continued with no observable disruption. Kidal offensive executed post-transition. Internal tensions documented but not operationally significant.

⚖ RESOLUTION: ECOWAS did not intervene. Bazoum remains detained; sanctions were progressively relaxed. ECOWAS's credibility as a security guarantor is significantly diminished.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Junta remains in power as of 2026. Elections postponed multiple times. ECOWAS sanctions partially lifted but full normalization not achieved.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Both motivations coexisted. France's genuine counter-terrorism contribution and strategic interests are not mutually exclusive. The political framing has polarized debate, making nuanced assessment difficult.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved — no international body has formally adjudicated the sanctions question. The FIDH case filed before the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (April 20, 2026) represents the first effort to establish legal accountability for atrocities by PMC forces in Mali; it does not directly address the arms pipeline.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Both dimensions are real and coexist. The al-Qaeda affiliation is genuine; local recruitment drivers are also genuine. Effective policy requires addressing both dimensions simultaneously.

⚖ RESOLUTION: The partnership's balance decisively shifted after April 25–30, 2026. Africa Corps failed catastrophically across all its primary objectives in a single week: Kidal fell in 24 hours, Ménaka's urban area was seized, the Defence Minister was killed, and an Mi-35 helicopter was lost — while the claimed 1,000+ militants killed was dismissed by analysts as implausible given concurrent territorial losses. Russia publicly rejected JNIM's demand for withdrawal on April 30, framing the crisis as a 'foiled coup' to avoid admitting defeat. The 'both elements coexist' equilibrium has broken: strategic losses now outpace visible gains, and Africa Corps' recruitment function for jihadists (via civilian targeting) accelerated the JNIM growth that produced the April 25 offensive.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved as of April 30, 2026 — Russia officially rejected withdrawal and pledged to continue operations. The practical question of whether Africa Corps can meaningfully secure FAMa positions without a full-scale reinforcement (which Russia has not announced) remains open.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Partial resolution — March 23, 2026: Mali released 100+ jihadist detainees in exchange for JNIM opening a fuel corridor to Bamako, ending a 7-month blockade. Diesel prices surged 29.7% to 940 CFA/L confirming structural economic damage. On March 31, 2026, FAMa's DIRPA publicly denied any prisoner release arrangement, stating Mali 'will not compromise with terrorists.' JNIM retained the ability to reinstate blockade; truce nominally valid until approximately Eid al-Adha (late May 2026). Ongoing fuel flow while the junta officially denies the deal that enabled it.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Partially resolved with contested denial — March 23 deal (100+ detainees released for fuel corridor) confirmed by price surge and resumed flow. March 31: FAMa DIRPA publicly denied any deal, complicating accountability. Truce nominally valid until ~Eid al-Adha (late May 2026). JNIM retains ability to reinstate blockade. Junta's official denial reinforces JNIM's leverage: it secured a major concession while the government cannot acknowledge it.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved — the Djibo assault of May 11, 2026 represents the most severe test of AES military capacity since the Alliance's inaugural declaration. The 9-hour occupation of a provincial capital without effective FAB response is a documented operational failure; the AES cannot claim the Unified Force improved security when Djibo — blockaded since 2022 — was overrun on the exact same day the AES declared readiness for 'large-scale operations.'

⚖ RESOLUTION: No evidence of French state sponsorship has been presented. AES accusations are diplomatic claims, not intelligence findings. The pattern of escalating violence after French withdrawal is inconsistent with the sponsorship hypothesis. The CNSP and Goïta juntas have a track record of disinformation (e.g., the 2022 Gossi fake mass grave staged by Wagner). The French government has not responded to the Dakar Forum accusations.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved as of May 4, 2026. Tall's whereabouts unknown. IAPL Monitoring and international legal organizations documenting the case. No charges announced; no warrant presented. Pattern is consistent with prior junta suppression of political voices since the January 2026 party ban.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved — JNIM's manifesto marks a significant evolution in messaging sophistication. Whether it attracts FAMa defections, civilian collaboration, or political party alignment could decisively shape the trajectory of the Malian state's survival. As of May 1, 2026, the Malian junta did not respond to the manifesto's contents.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved as of May 15, 2026. Junta has issued no response. Amnesty International and FIDH have called for investigation. The incident adds to a documented pattern of Fulani collective punishment operations in the Mopti-Ségou corridor — raising the question of whether systematic ethnic targeting constitutes a policy rather than individual excess.

⚖ RESOLUTION: False — Koufa is alive and active as of 2026 as JNIM's Fulani-operations commander. US designated him SDGT in 2019; UN sanctions followed in 2020.