Estampida deja 30+ muertos en Citadelle Laferrière; registro electoral suspendido indefinidamente; HRP financiado solo ~19.5% Sin procedencia registrada

⚖ RESOLUTION: On May 8, 2026, a Miami federal jury convicted all four defendants — Arcángel Pretel Ortiz, Antonio Intriago, Walter Veintemilla, and James Solages — on five counts including conspiracy to kill a foreign official, material support, and violating the US Neutrality Act. All face potential life sentences; sentencing scheduled for late summer 2026 before Judge Jacqueline Becerra. The verdict is the first US criminal accountability for the July 7, 2021 assassination but does not reach the alleged Haitian political and business masterminds, who remain unindicted. Key suspect Joseph Badio — believed to have recruited the Colombian mercenaries — has not been extradited to the US.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Haiti's chief prosecutor sought Henry's indictment in 2022; Henry never arrested. He resigned in March 2024 under gang pressure, not legal action.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Debated; Henry's government subsequently failed to hold elections or control gang violence, lending credibility to critics. CORE Group's role is widely cited in state collapse analyses.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US (May 2025). UN sanctions imposed. Viv Ansanm announced political party formation in March 2026, drawing international condemnation.

⚖ RESOLUTION: MSS formally concluded with final 150 Kenyan officers departing April 28, 2026, completing the phased drawdown. Over 22 months Kenya deployed ~700–800 of a pledged 1,000 officers; trained 2,000+ HNP; secured the airport and TPC installation. Gang control of Port-au-Prince expanded from ~80% to ~90% during the mission. GSF advance force now ~545 personnel (400 Chadian + 70 Salvadoran + 75 Guatemalan). April 23, 2026 UNSC briefing: national pledges exceed 5,500 authorized ceiling; $200M+ pledged by 13 states ($59M disbursed); Qatar pledged $30M. GSF operations Dec 2025–Feb 2026 resulted in 1,343 suspected gang members killed. Full 5,500-person strength expected fall–end 2026.

⚖ RESOLUTION: TPC mandate expired February 7, 2026. Powers transferred to PM Fils-Aimé. Elections scheduled August 30, 2026.

⚖ RESOLUTION: UN Sanctions Committee confirmed illicit US-origin weapons in gang hands. US Congress appropriated funds for anti-trafficking measures. Arms flow continues despite embargo.

⚖ RESOLUTION: UN acknowledged 'moral responsibility' in 2016. US courts upheld UN immunity in 2016. Victims' compensation fund of $400 million pledged but largely unfunded. 2022 resurgence linked to collapse of water systems, not UN forces.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Elections originally scheduled for August 30, 2026. CEP published approved party list March 26, 2026 (320 parties registered). Voter and candidate registration postponed on April 8, 2026, pending a new electoral decree. On May 6, 2026, CEP added a 30,000-member party registration requirement reducing the eligible pool. On May 12, 2026, PM Fils-Aimé declared on Magik9 radio: 'It is clear that the security conditions are not met at the level for us to have elections in August' — the first explicit abandonment of the August 30 date by the transitional government. He announced a revised target of elections by end of 2026, with a new president by February 2027. On June 6, 2026, the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince welcomed Haiti's electoral decree as 'an important step in the process leading to elections' — reaffirming US backing for the August 30 framework despite acknowledged security obstacles. UN Special Representative Ruiz Massieu attended a first-time voter awareness event June 5, calling youth participation 'essential' for elections. Current status as of June 7, 2026: no voter registration begun; 23 communes inaccessible; 75–90% of Port-au-Prince under gang control; GSF advance force at ~800 of the 5,500-person authorized ceiling with no coverage outside Port-au-Prince city center. Security preconditions for credible elections remain unmet.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Contested designation. Fragile States Index consistently ranks Haiti among the world's most fragile. CARICOM and US avoid 'failed state' label officially.

⚖ RESOLUTION: UN BINUH attributed primary civilian deaths to G9 sniper tactics. G9 sanctioned by UN in 2022. Investigation cited 207 confirmed civilian deaths attributed to G9 forces.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Haitian police commissioner for the region dismissed after the attack. MSS forces not deployed to Artibonite at time of massacre. Preventability contested.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Removal attempt failed after Saint-Cyr refused to sign. TPC mandate expired February 7, 2026, with Fils-Aimé assuming full executive authority.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Remittances totaled $4.1 billion in 2024 (15% of GDP). World Bank projects declining share of GDP as diaspora remittance capacity limits. No consensus on net long-term effect.

⚖ RESOLUTION: UN Sanctions Committee sanctioned individual businesspeople for gang ties. Broader systemic relationship documented but not publicly prosecuted. Pattern acknowledged in ICG and HRW reports.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Widely debated in academic and policy circles. Multiple UN reports acknowledge 'historical responsibility.' CORE Group's 2021 interference is documented. Haiti has received over $13 billion in international aid since 2010 with limited structural improvement.

⚖ RESOLUTION: TPS termination challenged in US courts as of 2026. No mass deportations completed. Haiti's government formally requested halt to deportations citing ongoing security crisis. On April 16, 2026, the US House passed bipartisan legislation 224–204 (with 10 Republican votes) requiring TPS extension through 2029; Trump administration threatened a veto and Senate Republicans pledged to block the bill. Rep. Andrew Clyde (R-GA) introduced legislation April 23 to repeal TPS entirely and give all holders 60 days to depart. US Supreme Court heard oral arguments on April 29, 2026 in consolidated cases Noem v. Doe / Trump v. Miot — the Court's conservative 6-3 majority appeared to signal deference to the Trump administration, with multiple justices questioning whether courts have power to review TPS termination decisions under a statutory non-reviewability clause; ruling expected late June or early July 2026. Senate advocates launched a push (week of May 19, 2026) to extend Haitian TPS through 2027 via standalone legislation — a lower-threshold ask than the House-passed 2029 extension — as the Supreme Court ruling approached. Haitian TPS holders (~350,000) and ~87,000 US-born children of TPS holders await the outcome. A ruling favoring deportation would coincide with: Day 16 (May 25) of MSF Cité Soleil hospital closure; Krache Dife IDP camp attack in Delmas 6 (2 killed, 24 houses burned); ~30,000 newly displaced since May 10; 1.5M total IDPs; 6.4M in acute humanitarian need. Haitian TPS holders contribute nearly $6 billion annually to the US economy per CNN Business. UPDATE Aug 20, 2026: the legal fight resolved in the administration's favor — the Supreme Court's June 25 ruling cleared termination effective July 26, and the first mass deportation flight since 2023 landed 161 people at Cap-Haïtien International Airport (diverted from Port-au-Prince, whose airport remains closed to commercial traffic through early September over gang violence). Haiti's migration office said it was 'not the Haitian state that asks for them to be sent back' and offered arrivals up to $65 and temporary shelter; advocacy groups warned the country 'is not ready to receive this number of migrants' amid 1.5M already displaced. NY Gov. Kathy Hochul publicly urged DHS the same day to reverse course, calling the termination a 'reckless and inhumane act' that would force New York to fire hundreds of essential workers by Aug 24 — a request DHS declined to act on. UPDATE Aug 27, 2026: a second wave landed 161 more people at Cap-Haïtien within a week — 104 removed from the Bahamas' Carmichael Road Detention Centre and 57 from the US, including US- and Brazil-born children — arriving within hours of each other; Haiti's migration office said none were former TPS beneficiaries, and reports indicated the administration plans to move from monthly to weekly deportation flights, compounding pressure on the already gang-besieged south via the Cap-Haïtien corridor.

⚖ RESOLUTION: US Congress approved $5M non-lethal FAd'H support in February 2026. FAd'H remains a small, lightly equipped force. Debate ongoing about its role versus GSF.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Contested. Gang extortion remains primary revenue source. GSF strategy includes disrupting gang financing networks. No precedent for Haiti-scale resolution in comparable state fragility context.

⚖ RESOLUTION: UN confirmed 207 deaths. BINUH described killings as constituting potential crimes against humanity. International Criminal Court jurisdiction discussion ongoing. No perpetrators arrested.

⚖ RESOLUTION: BINUH Q1 2026 report (May 8, 2026) found security forces responsible for 69% of Q1 2026 casualties, including 69 civilians (5 children) killed in drone strikes and 247 police summary executions documented in the prior period. HRW's March 2026 report documented 1,243 killed in 141 HNP drone operations (Mar 2025–Jan 2026). 14 specialized judges appointed in March 2026 for mass and financial crimes, representing a tentative accountability step. No formal GSF published code of conduct as of May 2026.

⚖ RESOLUTION: OHCHR said in October 2025 that drone strikes were 'disproportionate and likely unlawful.' BINUH Q1 2026 report (May 8, 2026) confirmed 69 civilian drone strike deaths in Q1. 14 specialized judges appointed in March 2026 to address mass crimes — a potential accountability mechanism. No criminal charges filed against security personnel for drone strike civilian deaths as of May 2026.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved as of August 30, 2026. PNH Director Paraison ordered an internal investigation into possible complicity or negligence; no findings had been released. A gang leader's hostage video simultaneously threatened Paraison against continued drone operations, complicating the security response. The UN Security Council held an emergency session on the massacre Aug 28, with Special Representative Carlos Ruiz Massieu urging faster activation of Haiti's specialized judicial units for mass-crimes accountability. No police-led rescue operation was reported; instead, community leader Luckson Jean entered gang territory on Aug 28 and personally negotiated the release of 13 hostages with UNICEF support -- a development residents cited as further evidence the state, not a private citizen, should have been the one freeing captives from a massacre police were already criticized for failing to prevent.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Still unresolved as of September 24, 2026 — the Council has not yet held its renewal vote, though PM Fils-Aimé used a special UN meeting that day to press Haiti's case, and the GSF has formally requested a two-year extension through September 2028. The US and Panama, the Council's co-penholders on Haiti, are expected to bring a resolution before the September 30 expiration.

⚖ RESOLUTION: Unresolved. As of September 2026, self-defense brigades continue to operate with tacit police cooperation in parts of Artibonite and greater Port-au-Prince even as rights monitors document abuses; the GSF has not moved to disarm or formally integrate them, leaving their legal status and accountability ambiguous ahead of the December 13, 2026 elections.